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ABSTRACT
There is little empirical research identifying the structural forces influencing the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The purpose of this study was to
analyze the structural forces underlying international accounting regulation to contribute
insights useable by the public, politicians, and scholars to conceptualize the processes of
international accounting regulation. Based on stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, and
social network theory it was posited that this network is rationally created to serve certain
stakeholder groups in the face of divergent stakeholder interests. The research questions
for this study addressed the organizations which constituted the IASB’s governance
network, the professional and geographic perspectives represented, and the extent to
which the governance network was structurally embedded. Social network methodology
was utilized within a case study design. All data consisted of publically available existing
data. Social network analysis including graphic notations, density, comembership
overlap, and co-organizational overlap were employed to produce a representation of the
governance network and to measure the extent to which the network was structurally
embedded. To provide supplementary detail, the professional perspectives and
geographic representations of the actors were measured. The results indicated that the
network forms a definable hierarchy that exhibits qualities of structural embeddedness.
Banking interests were more embedded within the governance network than any other
professional, academic, or social group. Also, a strong Western influence was detected.
The societal benefit of this effort was to engage society in general and accounting
researchers in particular in hopes of encouraging diverse representation in regulatory
processes with both macro and micro-consequences.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO STUDY
Introduction
Mainstream accounting theory holds that accounting is neutral or more
appropriately a functional craft that should be, and currently is, well removed from its
societal potentialities (Roslender, 2006). This is problematical given that the U.S.
financial crisis of September 2008 was in large part predicated, and conceivably revealed,
by seemly neutral accounting regulations. For example, accounting jargon, such as the
mark-to-market rule, is finding commonplace in the media coverage of the financial crisis
(Gannon, 2009). Calling into question a few accounting regulations is a veil for much
larger regulatory issues within a fallible economic system (Mark-to-market accounting,
2009; United States Securities and Exchange Commission, n.d.). Whether these issues
will be identified in the mainstream or not remains to be seen. One thing; however, is
marked, the accounting regulations underlying financial markets and economic policies
do affect society (Carson, King, & Lewis, 2008).
In a majority of mainstream discourse on accounting convergence positive
potentiality is taken for granted rather than empirically investigated (Nicolaisen, 2005;
Tweedie & Seidenstein, 2005). The goal of accounting convergence, or adopting a single
set of internationally accepted financial accounting standards, is to promote global
economic interconnectiveness by creating an unparalleled liquidity of international
capital markets (Nicolaisen, 2005). At face value accounting standards govern the
method(s) in which economic data are recorded and subsequently reported in the
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financial statements of issuing entities (Weygandt, Kieso, & Kimmel, 2008). These
standards range from the classification of transactions to the monetary amount to be
recognized in order to properly capture the economic substance of the transaction(s) in
question. Though technical, accounting standards create incentives or disincentives,
depending on the application, for organizations to conduct certain types of business, in
certain areas and with certain stakeholders (Perry & Nolke, 2006). For example,
according to James (2008) a recent accounting regulation requires companies to increase
the expense as well as the related liability associated with company funded pension plans
and other post retirement benefit plans, such as health care. This regulation not only
adversely impacts the financial statements but it also diminishes a company’s willingness
to offer such plans. As a result employee stakeholders are less likely to benefit from the
security inherent of defined benefit retirement plans (James, 2008). Given the proven
market volatilities of personal retirement investment accounts, such as 401K investments,
the potentiality of this accounting disincentive alone is staggering. Yet this is only one
example of how the process of setting accounting standards shapes economic transactions
which in turn directly affect societies (Cooper, Neu, & Lehman, 2003; Gallhofer &
Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005a, 2005b).
The processes of global accounting regulation are encapsulated in the work of
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Steward (2005). Global regulation functions in a space they deem
global administrative law. In particular, they noted that, “emerging patterns of global
governance are being shaped by a little-noticed but important and growing body of global
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administrative law” (p. 15). International accounting regulations fostered by the
accounting convergence movement is one of the more significant happenings in global
administrative law. To date; however, the arena of global administrative law, in general,
and accounting convergence, in particular, is uninformed about the scope, structure, and
impact of these global administrators (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a,
2005b).
This study examined the structural elements of the International Accounting
Standards Board’s (IASB) governance network. Although the prospect of global
accounting governance may seem well removed from the traditional arrangement of
national accounting regulation, the proliferation of international reporting standards has
profound effects on national as well as global economies (Cooper & Robson, 2006;
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2004; Graham & Neu, 2003; Schmidt, 2002). As pointed out by
Cooper and Robson (2006) it is hardly possible to study international accounting
regulation seriously without considering the complex web of alliances, agreements, and
accords that exist between these organizations. This governance network is understudied.
Problem Statement
At present there is little available empirical research identifying the structural
forces influencing the IASB. Although researchers such as Mattli and Buthe (2005a,
2005b) and Brown (2004) have attempted to address this disparity, no attempts have been
made in mainstream accounting literature to holistically examine the IASB’s governance
network even though the need for such efforts has been expressed for at least a decade
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(Hopwood, 1994; Laughlin, 1999). That the IASB’s governance network has yet to
receive significant scholarly attention even in light of such troublesome concerns is, to be
sure, the problem.
Specifically it is questioned why proven theoretical and methodological tools such
as social network analysis have not been applied to explore the milieu of the IASB
(Laughlin, 1995). In particular scholarly inquiries of this type can identify the
organizations that constitute the IASB’s governance network and measure the extent to
which individual actors are structurally embedded within the network (Jones et al., 1997;
Rowley, 1997). Additional mathematical analysis can add further conceptual detail to the
governance network by measuring the professional perspectives and geographic
representation of the individual actors.
Much literature is cautiously silent or expressly limited as to the specific interests
and influences of the organizations within the IASB’s governance network (Nicolaisen,
2005; Tweedie & Seidenstein, 2005). Nevertheless the compelling findings uncovered by
a minority of contemporary, even critical, scholars elicit suspicions, perhaps to a lesser
degree curiosity, about the inner workings of the IASB (Brown, 2004; Gallhofer &
Haslam, 2005; Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005a). If the adoption of international
accounting standards is accepted as an economically, politically, and socially important
phenomenon, then the standard setting process demands empirical scrutiny.
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Given the recent financial crisis in the U.S. a critical examination of the
organizational stakeholder’s interest in, possibly even influence over, the accounting
regulators is of urgent relevance. Consequently the strict fundamentalist view of neutral
accounting is rejected; perhaps even toxic in its own right (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2005;
Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005a). It is evident that accounting requirements can be used
to serve the public’s interest by issuing certain guidance, or to serve particular interests
by issuing contrary guidance. The judgment of what constitutes fair and equable
valuations is far from straightforward (Perry & Nolke, 2006). As a result stakeholder
influence within the regulatory body can convey broad power and even greater
consequences (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Schmidt, 2002).
Assuming a broader scope to address these stakeholder interests Hopwood (1994),
Gallhofer and Haslam (2006), and Lehman (2005b) noted the menacing influence of
nongovernmental global institutions; although none go as far as creating a holistic
network per se. Gallhofer and Haslam (2006) wrote, “there is much that is reflective in
accounting phenomena of the very unfair and highly problematic global context…and
accounting is constitutive of the problematics of its context too” (p. 919). Laughlin
(1999) echoed this position by questioning critical accounting researchers for neglecting,
“accounting-related thinking in regulatory process” (Societal dimensions section, para.
4). Therefore, considering the rate at which international accounting regulations are
replacing national regulations, there is an imperative need for scholars to define and
explore the IASB’s governance network.
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Background of Problem
In an effort to facilitate cross-border trading and financial statement comparability
throughout the world the IASB has been charged with furthering the movement toward
one international set of accounting standards (Ruder et al., 2005). The movement toward
a single set of international financial reporting standards is known as accounting
convergence or formerly accounting harmonization. This rapid escalation of economic
globalization, otherwise a race for financial return, has necessitated a desire by many
actors for internationally comparable financial data. As a result accounting convergence
has gained mainstream support as it supplies the processes necessary to achieve a unified
capital market (Nicolaisen, 2005).
The business of financial accounting is viewed as a, if not the, major impediment
to the raging whirlwind of economic globalization. Capital markets must minimize
investor risks, maximize investor returns, and produce comparable financial information
for decision-based investing (Herz & Petrone, 2005; Nicolaisen, 2005; Tweedie &
Seidenstein, 2005). An efficient global capital market must be interpreted by comparable
accounting or regulatory standards (Cooper et al., 2003; Graham & Neu, 2003). Over the
last decade organizations such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the World Trade Organization (WTO), national
governments, and the World Bank have labored to achieve a single set of international
accounting standards (Herz & Petrone, 2005; Nicolaisen, 2005). This labor of interested
actors has been realized. Accounting convergence is a global reality (IASB, 2008a).
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Whereas the reality of accounting convergence cannot be questioned, whether its
forging was precipitated by actual users of financial accounting information is
problematic. It appears that the ordinary users of accounting data, “…tend to be
represented rhetorically rather than physically” (Hopwood, 1994, p. 243) by financial
accounting proponents and regulators. Hopwood (1994) detailed a lack of empirical
analysis on the international demand for accounting convergence. Further he questioned
the undemocratic trends toward privatization and standardization based on the westerncentric philosophies of capital market effectiveness and efficiency. In this light Hopwood
urged contemporary researchers to consider the cosmopolitan effects of international
accounting, the ambiguity and complexity of the powers behind this influential
movement, and how such powers pervade society.
An optimistic vantage of unrestricted capital flows is echoed in the majority of
prevailing research on accounting convergence (Gannon & Ashwal, 2004; Tokar, 2005;
Tweedie & Seidenstein, 2005). It is claimed that, "it is, however, the right objective and
one that should be pursued vigorously, as it offers tremendous opportunities for all
involved…" (Tokar, 2005, p.710) and "[accounting convergence]…will contribute to the
economic betterment for us all" (Nicolaisen, 2005, p. 685). The processes of accounting
convergence may provide positive returns in the global economic system. For example,
international standards may reduce the cost of capital for organizations and provide new
opportunities for investors (Tweedie & Seidenstein, 2005). However, a dissenting few
challenged this notion of benign betterment (Cooper et al., 2003; Hopwood, 1994;
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Lehman, 2005a, 2005b; McCombie & Deo, 2005).
Supposing in the vein of mainstream accounting theory that the policies of
accounting convergence are concentrated exclusively, or at least chiefly, on
unprecedented and exponential growth of the economic sector, the processes of its
institutional creation, procedural accountability, societal inclusion, and imposition of
global control demand high order on the accounting agenda (Giddings et al., 2002;
Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005a, 2005b; UN, 1987). The issues concerning the authority
and capacity to regulate accounting convergence are well noted by Cooper and Robson
(2006). One approach requires questioning the structural realities and institutional
democracy of the international accounting regulator directly (Laughlin, 1999, 1995).
Mattli and Buthe (2005b) asserted that the establishment of international
accounting standards is, “one of the economically and politically most important areas
where governance functions have been delegated to the private sector” (p. 400). There are
many compelling reasons to delegate such authority. According to Principal-Agent
literature the decision to delegate is attractive when the economic or political costs of
internal production are greater than the external costs. For example, governmental
regimes may not have the resources to attract and maintain the expertise necessary to
produce high quality regulation. Moreover, private bodies are not encumbered by the
bureaucracy often associated with governmental processes (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a).
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Respective of this level of assumed importance; however, there is a noted lack of
accountability built into the regulatory process of setting international financial reporting
standards (IFRS) (Brown, 2004; Cooper & Robson, 2006; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2005;
Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). The regulatory responsibility for promulgating IFRSs
was “delegated to (or effectively been acquired by)” (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b, p. 399) the
IASB in 2001. The IASB is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) primarily funded by
large corporations, accounting firms, stock exchanges, banking institutions, and other
interested stakeholders (Brown, 2004). The IASB operates at a transnational level
virtually free of traditional nation-state governmental controls (Kingsbury et al, 1999).
Although the IASB is not a democratically valid body per se a host of prevailing parties
such as the World Bank, Bank of International Settlements, SEC, United Nations, and
national government officials have formally legitimized them as the global accounting
regulator (Buthe & Mattli, 2005a, 2005b; Cooper & Robson, 2006).
From inception the IASB has been criticized for its western-centric organizational
structure and membership (Brown, 2004; Giddings et al., 2002; Lehman, 2005a; Neu et
al., 2005). In 2002 only 1 of the IASB’s 14 board members hailed from a developing
country (Brown, 2004). The IASB’s constitution limits board membership to English
speaking accounting experts (IASC, 2000). This; however, is not unreasonable (Mattli &
Buthe, 2005b). For example, it is reasonable for the average person to expect that
accounting regulators need members with accounting expertise. Furthermore, Mattli and
Buthe (2005b) explained this phenomenon as resulting from an uneven geographical
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distribution whereas the majority of accounting experts are concentrated in America and
the United Kingdom.
Other criticisms of the IASB relate to procedural transparency and inclusion
(Hopwood, 1994; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b; McCombie & Deo, 2005); national
legitimacy (Schmidt, 2002), regulatory fairness in the face of diverging interest (Chand &
White, 2007), and the influence of international organizations (Caramanis, 2002; Graham
& Neu, 2003; Lehman, 2005). Yet in light of such serious criticisms few have aptly
examined the IASB’s larger role in globalization and society (Cooper & Robson, 2006;
Graham & Neu, 2003). To this Lehman (2005b) warned, “…without a full analysis of
their [non-governmental organizations] role in civil society, it is possible that they will be
captured by external forces, including but not limited to economic logic that guides a
corporate mandate to maximise [sic] outputs and minimise [sic] costs” (p. 3).
During the last decade the landscape of global accounting regulation has morphed
at an exponential pace. Existing nonprofit organizations have been capitalized and
revamped while new nonprofit organizations have been legitimized before incorporation
articles and by-laws were released in print. Perhaps the world’s financial markets have
been captured by external forces. Or, perhaps centralized financial regulation and the
aggressive promotion of standardized international financial systems is a public service.
Such answers, of course, remain to be seen and should be explored by accounting
scholars (Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005b).
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Purpose of the Study
The work herein promotes a broader, more inclusive understanding of how
accounting technology is mobilized in the global sphere. It is theorized that a systematic
concentration on the organizations involved with global regulation is necessary to
illuminate the underlying network driving accounting convergence (Cooper & Robson,
2006; Graham & Neu, 2003). Further that such a network has a profound, if not superior,
impact on the purposes, intents, and overall direction of accounting convergence
(Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 1999; Granovetter, 1992; Jones et al., 1997; Lehman,
2005a; Rowley, 1997). A critical exploration, such as the present work, contributes a
fundamental holistic description of the IASB’s greater governance network, which is
lacking at present.
Transparent knowledge of the actual power structures is sparse and seemingly
well hidden within the published context of the IASB’s organizational structure. Such
vagueness only exacerbates attempts to understand or even explain the administrative
issues previously discussed in the realm of international accounting regulation (Cooper &
Robson, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Perry & Nolke, 2006). This fact; however, is not
coded to discount the professionalism, expertise or talent of accounting professionals in
general; instead it may infer systematic issues. Accordingly, these issues are approached
by focusing on the networks of organizations bound by cooperative control, structural
agreements, and professionalization promulgating international regulation in an
environment that Habermas (1991) described as, “…private law shrouded in quasi-public
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authority” (p. 149).
Buthe and Mattli (2005) speculated that these issues are largely ignored by
nonaccounting scholars due to self-perceived ignorance, as likely to be noninterest, of
complex and technical accounting information. Additionally, they theorized that lack of
procedural inclusion and IASB transparency excludes many mainstream accounting
professionals with the technical expertise to appreciate these issues. In so much, an
analysis uncomplicated by procedural accounting jargon, at least to the degree possible,
supplies a building block for reflection on global accountancy. This is to stimulate
discourse; regardless if the resulting discourse is positive, negative or neutral (Hopwood,
1994; Lehman, 2005b). Hence, the purpose of positive analysis of the structural forces
underlying international accounting regulation is to contribute insights which may be
used by the public, politicians, and scholars alike to conceptualize the complex network
of organizational as well as individual actors promulgating international accounting
regulation.
Theoretical Framework
Although critical accounting theory remains on the fringe of accounting
scholarship, its small following has grown in recent decades. As Roslender (2006)
explained the underlying goal of critical scholarship is to bring awareness to the
accounting profession, as well as those outside the profession, of the conditions and
consequences of accounting action. Disregarding the various ideological positions of
critical theory, one theme emerged consistent among early critical scholars. Namely,
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many critical scholars emphasize the role of superstructural factors (Laughlin, 1995;
Laughlin & Puxty, 1985; Roslender).
The milieu of the IASB is complex for traditional sociological analysis (Jones et
al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). To overcome this complexity issue, much existing literature on
the milieu of the IASB and/or its stakeholder relationships is rooted in traditional
sociological analysis limiting the population of study to the IASB, a subset of its funding
organizations or its regulatory standards (Brown, 2004; Brown, Tower, & Taplin, 2004;
Caramanis, 2002; Lehman, 2005a; Neu et al., 2006). In such studies positivistic or
institutional ideological positions are traditionally assumed. The value of such studies is
not questioned; yet, the progression of identifying the broader milieu in which the IASB
operates remains neglected (Laughlin, 1999; Laughlin & Puxty, 1983). Putting forth a
bounded social network for the IASB explicitly requires a nontraditional exploratory
study to bridge this caveat in existing literature.
A triangulation of theoretical perspectives is one approach to redress such caveats.
The proposed triangulation critically appraises multiple theoretical approaches
concurrently employed in accounting research to, “…capture a comprehensive, holistic,
and contextual portrayal” (Hopper & Hoque, 2006, p. 478) of the IASB’s governance
network. Moreover, this approach is capable of informing broader potentialities not
currently accessible at an individual theory level. Due to differing ontological and
epistemological perspectives, this approach is not without debate, the magnitude of which
is to vast to include here. Thus, a defensive preamble is fitting (Roslender, 2006).
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First, triangulation of multiple theoretical perspectives is generally accepted by
accounting researchers (Hopper & Hoque, 2006; Klumps, 2001). Second, the philosophy
of science can make very few, if any, claims lending supremacy to one theoretical
position over another (Geyer, 2003). To this point, multiple epistemological positions are
vital if academia is to keep pace with society’s need for information (Savage & Burrows,
2007). Third, theoretical hypocrisy can be, and is, viewed as “dubious” (Hopper &
Hoque, 2006; Latour, 1999). To illustrate, Klumps (2001) found that accounting
regulators in the U.S. intentionally disregarded certain theoretical perspectives over
others to favor the interest of more powerful stakeholders.
Mattli and Buthe (2005b) studied the IASB’s global governance using a modified
P-A theory framework. Specifically they asserted:
Regulatory institutions like IASB and FASB, however, are not fixed structures…We
focus here on an important dimension of change: change in the extent to which these
bodies have embraced, resisted, instituted, or rejected mechanisms of administrative
law…We seek to explain such changes as well as the general operation of privatesector accounting governance as a function of political and structural factors, such as
power, control, dependency, and knowledge asymmetries. (p. 228)
Although the above excerpt is reflected herein, the epistemological foundations differ
greatly. P-A theory is methodologically stiff in that its predictive value hinges on the
ability to examine singular, unilateral ties between an actor and a principal (Prossor,
2005). Mattli and Buthe (2005b) attempted to correct this shortcoming by theorizing the
existence of multiple principals. This stretches the notions of P-A theory, albeit not in a
fully unacceptable manner. When applied in this manner the theory is represented as the
distance of a public principal (P) and 2 competing stakeholder groups (SH1 and SH2) on
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a particular policy dimension (X) (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b, p. 233).
The limitations of stakeholder theory as a whole are obvious. The rigid
positivistic assumptions fail to provide a comprehensive mapping of the IASB’s
governance network. In fact, such shortcomings are frequently cited by critics. For
example, the isolated focus on dyadic relationships between known, and consequently
important, stakeholder groups often “ignores or mistreats other stakeholders” (Alam,
2006, p. 207). On one hand, the conceptualization that organizations will satisfy
important stakeholder groups that provide operational and/or financial viability is
necessarily sound. On the other hand, Mattli and Buthe’s (2005b) stakeholder theory
cannot fully conceptualize complex stakeholder relationships in motion.
A more naturalistic approach to organizational viability can be found in
legitimacy theory. Legitimacy is commonly accepted as,
A condition or status which exists when an entities value system is congruent with
the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. When
disparity, actual or potential, exists between two value systems there is a threat to the
entity’s legitimacy.
(Lindblom as cited in Deegan, 2006, p. 162)
Legitimacy theory assumes that social systems are temporally as well as spatially
situational as they are dependent upon socially constructed norms (Deegan, 2006). This
concept of situational dependency introduces a necessary contrast to P-A theory. For
example, legitimacy theory presupposes that as socially constructed expectations change
so must the organizations that depend on societal legitimacy for survival. Thus, the
theoretical divergence is slight, nonetheless critical. For example, P-A theory assumes a
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predictable state of divergence within a stable organizational system; whereas, legitimacy
theory assumes a diverging organizational response within a socially constructed reality.
Clearly, the latter is acknowledged herein.
Legitimacy theory alone; however, is inherently problematic. It is supposed that
the IASB, according to legitimacy theory, exhibits a profound legitimacy gap. Or, as
defined by Deegan (2006), “a lack of correspondence (or a ‘gap’) between how a society
believes an organization should act and how it is perceived that the organization has
acted” (p. 163, emphasis original). Accordingly, by forcing such normative judgments
legitimacy theory is overly complicated given the exploratory nature of the present study.
Both the methodological individualism of P-A theory and the normative basis of
legitimacy theory neglect the underlying importance of social structure. Granovetter
(1992) posited that social structures, such as the IASB’s governance network, albeit
dynamic, “…are constructed by individuals whose action is both facilitated and
constrained by the structure and the resources available in social networks in which they
are embedded” (p. 7). However, this is not the case with Mattli and Buthe’s (2005b) P-A
theory which to a certain degree presupposes the stability of network structures.
White, Boorman, and Beiger (1976) wrote, “…that the presently existing, largely
categorical descriptions of social structure have no solid theoretical grounding;
furthermore network concepts may provide the only way to construct a theory of social
structure” (p. 732). In as much, social network theory corrects the above issues noted
with P-A theory and legitimacy theory. For example, social network theory can reconcile
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that the IASB operates in a politically charged, dynamic milieu prejudiced by a litany of
interested parties lobbying for consideration (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Mattli & Buthe,
2005a, 2005b). Moreover, in order to fully appreciate this web of influence it is necessary
to examine the relational ties between the IASB and its stakeholders at both the
organizational and the individual levels. Again to achieve these ends one can refer to the
theoretical and methodological contributions of social network theory (Jones et al., 1997;
Rowley, 1997; White et al., 1976).
In sum, the naturalistic ontology of legitimacy theory is appropriate when
combined with the less normative analysis of diverging interests found in P-A theory.
The honored epistemological and ontological propositions of the aforementioned theories
perfectly complement social network theory which stresses sophisticated methodological
analysis over philosophical ideology (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). For these reasons
social network analytics used as a harmonizing methodological tool corrects the issues
noted above while also achieving the objectives herein.
Assumptions
Recent research in critical accounting literature has focused on the relationship of
accounting to globalization (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006) as well as its impacts on society
by means of economical, cultural or political demonstrations (Arnold, 2004; Brown,
2004; Caramanis, 2002; Neu et al., 2005). These efforts have produced divergent
theoretical propositions suggesting that financial accounting is a powerful influence in
the progression of globalization (Gallhoer & Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Mattli

18

& Buthe, 2005a). Hereby it is assumed that accounting convergence serves an integral
role in globalization and an absolute role toward the creation of a unified worldwide
economic system.
Several general assumptions are explicit in social network methodology. First, it
is assumed that the patterns derived by manipulating relational ties within group
boundaries are able to produce meaningful results. These basic assumptions remain intact
although the consensus on whether these results are causal, predictive, probable, or
descriptive varies greatly depending on the theorist, method, fit, and data (Wasserman &
Faust, 1999). Second, it is assumed that network positions restrain actors (Burt, 1976).
Or, that the degrees to which actors are autonomous to pursue individualistic goals is a
function of their structural position within a given network (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman,
1993). Finally, it is assumed that actors are both purposeful and rational (Burt, 1976;
Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1993). In these respects actors commonly create, employ,
control, or manipulate network structures to achieve desired outcomes (Granovetter,
2001; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997).
Koza and Lewin (1999) argued that alliance networks are “rationally
constructed…and may be reasonability viewed as instrumentalities for accomplishing
intended aims” (p. 640). Their position is consistent with the conditions of structural
embeddedness (Jones et al., 1997), network stakeholder influence (Rowley, 1997), and
exchange network power (Markovsky, Willer, & Patton, 1988). In particular Koza and
Lewin found that elite accounting firms/professionals intentionally created a thriving
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alliance network—Nexia International—for the purposes of strategically capitalizing on
the internationalization of accounting standards. It is assumed that the IASB’s
governance network represents this form of a strategic alliance network. This position is
further supported throughout these writings.
Scope and Delimitations
This study provides a positive examination of existing data for the purposes of
teasing out the IASB’s governance network. The goal was not to conclude an exhaustive
depiction of stakeholders, define their degree of interest, or assign finite levels of
influence per se; but to provide a holistic picture of this governance network enriched
with finely crafted empirical details (Laughlin, 1995, 1983).
The official authority for promulgating IFRSs rests with the IASB board. The 16
members of the IASB board have sole sanction, by majority vote, to enact a particular
accounting treatment. They are such an integral part of the standard setting process that
the entire organization is simply referred to as the IASB. Thus the power and influence of
IASB board is not questioned (Brown, 2004). Although the influence of the IASB board
is assumed to have a considerable impact on the standard setting process, it remains only
a portion of the whole organization and an even smaller portion of the financial
regulation governance network (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Kingsbury, 2005; Jones et al.,
1997).
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To define this governance network the IASB was considered the focal
organization. An ego-centric sampling technique was employed in subsequent sections to
affix the governance network’s boundaries. Accordingly these boundaries represent the
single population of study otherwise referred to as the IASB’s governance network.
Multiple modalities, or levels of analysis, were applied to the governance
network. Multiple modalities naturally arise in multi-organizational networks. These
modalities arise from the assumption that individual actors constitute the governance
network and the organizations to which each individual is affiliated are also embedded
within the same network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
Moreover, multiple modalities are used to enhance the validity of these conclusions via
methodological triangulation.
Relational data were used to create a representation of the IASB’s governance
network structure. The resulting picture symbolizes a “neutral framework” (White et al.,
1976, p. 732) for analyzing the IASB’s governance network (Laughlin, 1983). That is,
drawing causal inferences or predictably was cautiously avoided. Even further,
generalizability to any other network was not implied. These results solely represent the
population of interest or the IASB’s governance network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
These data; however, are deterministic. In that the measured relations accurately
reflect the underlying structure of the governance network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
Expressly, a priori categories and/or attributes are not imposed nor are they required
(Freidkin, 1993; Hanneman & Riddle; Wasserman & Faust, 1999; White et al., 1976).
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Instead the actors are bound by their relational ties within the network to produce
analytical imagines that should be “specifically interpreted for specific populations”
(White et al., 1976, p. 731).
The direction for these outcomes was informed by critical accounting theory. In
so much this contribution risks being prematurely discounted by scholars of the
functionalists sort or overly applied by scholars with similar concerns (Latour, 1999). In
defense prevailing functionalistic theories do not allow for broader accounting
perspectives such as this (Roslender, 2006). As a result, many mainstream scholars all but
disregard the consequences of accounting; only to exuberate the functionalist mantra
ingrained by a rigorous professionalization process (Cooper & Robson; Granovetter,
1992). Why is a connection between accounting and society, other than economic benefit
of course, so difficult to accept?
Seminal theorists including, but certainly not limited to, Kant (1992/1724-1804),
Hegel (1977/1952), Nietzsche (2003/1913), and Foucault (1969) allow such inquiry to
proceed. As stressed by Roslender (2006) critical accounting theory is not necessarily
incompatible with the percepts of scientific inquiry. Moreover, the empirical focus of
critical theorists, such as Laughlin (1995), affirmed that objective empirical findings are
themselves substantial contributions. For example, the objective contributions of social
network analysis are robustly validated in similar empirical studies (Freidkin, 1993,
2004; Koza & Lewin, 1999; Moody, 2004; Moody & White, 2003). The scope here,
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“…becomes the theory for this particular event” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 67) wholly
incompatible with nomological law-like generalizations.
Limitations
Although structural analysis of social networks has earned a respectable alter in
social research design, considerable care must be exercised when employing these
methods (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). As detailed above causal implications are avoided;
particularly since such inferences are often made in error by social network researchers
(Bonacich, 1987; Burt, 1987). Social network analytics is theoretically rooted in the
present; the graphic representations carry no claims to the past or future. Network
analysis, when causal inference is avoided, depicts what currently is; not what it should
be and definitely not what it will be. This representation, of course, is temporally induced
as dynamic political, organizational, and other complex factors are inherent to the very
human activity of accounting (d’Arcy, 2001). For example, the IASB’s influences are
acutely confounded by the international political environment (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b).
Another obvious limitation is that alternative standard setting bodies and/or
regulatory practices were not identified. Although it is suggested that inherent problems
exist with the IASB’s current structure, recommendations for specific improvements are
beyond the scope of this research. It is rather easy to be critical of the IASB and its
stakeholders. On the other hand, depending on one’s perspective a case for positive
potentiality can be made (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006).
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Finally, the troublesome aspects of critical theory are acknowledged. This work
made no attempt to reconcile concerns between critical theorists in the postmodern and
modern camps (Burrell, 1994). In this respect, references to Habermas (1991) does not
imply modernity de facto; Foucault (1969), Kant (1992), and Nietzsche (2003) are
equally informed. These arguments are avoidable, conceivably for future inclusion, with
an intentional departure from critical theory, perhaps fatally for classification as such.
The rationale for this decision is simple: to maintain objectivity through verifiable
empirical methodology. The heart of these issues, namely moral reasoning, was left for
interpretation.
Research Design
Social network methodology is particularly suited for rigorously examining
complex, interorganizational relationships (Bonacich, 1987; Gerlach, 1992; Jones et al.,
1997; Rowley, 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Sociological methods traditionally
founded on qualitative concepts, which are statistically manipulated as quantitative data
collapse, or at the very least suffer, when dealing with whole networks (Aziz & McLeay,
2007; Gerlach, 1992; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). In fact, White et al. (1976) argued that
social network methodology offers the only tools suited for this type of inquiry. This
approach presents a diverse, yet complementary, method for studying the IASB and
consequently the preferable method for providing rich conceptual details not available to
other methods (Koza & Lewin, 1999; Jones et al, 1997; Rowley, 1997).
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It is not implied that traditional sociological methods are not without considerable
merit; instead that they are inappropriate for this type of structural analysis (Aziz &
McLeay, 2007; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). For
example, Gerlach’s (1992) utilization of social network methods to explore the overall
Japanese corporate network contributed powerful holistic insights that only
complimented and enhanced the rich literature of more traditional studies. On this point,
Aziz and McLeay (2007), also noting the limits of traditional methods, developed an
index of accounting harmonization via global financial statement comparability. Their
study was based on modeling notations, specifically cross-sectional linear regressions,
that are remarkably similar to the sociometric notions and mathematical equations used in
the present work. Additionally, Koza and Lewin (1999) successfully employed social
network techniques in an empirical examination of firms within the accounting
profession.
For these reasons an exploratory case study methodology coupled with social
network tools was selected to examine the IASB’s governance network. Specifically
Yin’s (2003) embedded case study guidance for existing documentation analysis was
adopted. Social network analyses were used to produce a graph of the whole IASB’s
governance network as well as to test the network’s structural property of embeddedness
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Further analysis of the network actors’ geographic
representation as well as professional perspectives added another layer of conceptual
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detail. Finally, the aforementioned designed was applied to answer the below research
questions.
Definitions of Terms
This section contains some basic concepts and terminology from social network
theory used in these writings. These concepts are defined in terms of social network
theory. Additional clarification is also provided for specialized use within this context.
Accounting convergence: The convergence of national accounting regulations into
a single set of internationally applicable financial reporting standards (Ruder et al., 2005).
IASB’s governance network: The IASB’s governance network is a theoretical
entity marked by an intentional network structure (Jones, et. al, 1997; Rowley, 1997).
The boundaries of this network are based on authoritative control via governance charters
and other such administrative ties.
Social network analysis: Wasserman and Faust (1999) described social network
analysis as a process used, “…to express relationally defined theoretical concepts by
providing formal definitions, measures, and descriptions, to evaluate models and theories
in which key concepts and propositions are expressed as relational processes or structural
outcomes…”(p. 5).
Social network data: Social network data are characterized by Wasserman and
Faust (1999) as, “at least one structural variable measured on a set of actors” (p. 28).
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Social network: A social network is a discrete set of actors and the relation(s)
ascribed to them (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Social networks can be either 1-mode or 2mode networks.
Modes: Wasserman and Faust (1999) defined a mode as a network term used,
“…to refer to a distinct set of entities on which the structural variables are measured” (p.
29).
One-mode networks: In a 1-mode network the structural variable being measured
is the relationship between a single set of actors within the network or actor to actor ties.
For example, data on the friendship among students in a school would be considered a 1mode network (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). This type of network is used to measure the
ties between students. Hanneman and Riddle (2005) referred to 1-mode network analysis
as examining microlevel network properties.
Two-mode networks: Two-mode networks measure the ties between actors and
events instead of the ties between actors and actors. As Hanneman and Riddle (2005)
explained, “data like these involve two levels of analysis (or two ‘modes’). Often, such
data are termed ‘affiliation’ data because they describe which actors are affiliated
(present, or members of) which macro structures” (Ch. 17, Introduction section.).
Nodes: The specific individual or organizational actors within the network data
are also referred to as nodes. Or, the actors are the nodes within the social network and
the organizations are also nodes within a 2-mode network. Nodes can be any social
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entity. As Wasserman and Faust (1999) clarified, “actors are discrete individual,
corporate, or collective social units” (p. 17).
Individual actors: As mentioned above, actors or nodes within a network can be
any type of social unit. Individual nodes denote individual persons within the social
network (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
Organizational actors: For these purposes, an organizational actor or node is a
specific organization within the social network. For example, the IASB as a collective
social unit represents an organizational actor or node.
Relations: Hanneman and Riddle (2005) asserted that, “social network data are
defined by actors and relations (or ‘nodes’ and ‘edges’)” (Ch. 1, Nodes section).
Relations are the structural variables by which the actors are measured (Borgatti &
Everett, 2006; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
Relational ties: The social ties, or relations, that link the actors to one another
within the social network are relational ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
Graph: A graph or graphic representation (G) is a mathematical object comprised
of vertices (V) and edges (E). Therefore graphs are commonly denoted as G(V,E). Figure
1 below illustrates a basic, non-directional graph. The nodes or vertices include a, b, c, d,
and e and are denoted as V={a, b, c, d, e}. These nodes can be defined to represent
specific organizational or individual actors depending on the network data. The lines
represent the edges, or relational ties, in the below graph. In social networks the edges
measure instances or relationships between the nodes. For example, the relationship
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between node a and node b is denoted as e(a,b). Accordingly the complete set of edges in
the below graph can be denoted as E={(a,b),(b,c),(c,d),(c,e),(e,d)} (Borgatti & Everett,
2006). Or, node a has a relational tie with node b, node b has a relational tie with node c,
node c has a relational tie with nodes d and e, and so forth.

Note: Created with NetDraw 2.081 cited as Borgatti, 2002.

Figure 1: Basic non-directional graph.

A set of actors or nodes can also be referred to as N. In Figure 1 the set N contains
all actors or N = {a,b,c,d,e}. The term lines, or for directed graphs arcs, are often used
interchangeably for the term edges. A single relation can be described as l and the entire
set of relations as L. Thus, in Figure 1 L is the same as E or L =
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{(a,b),(b,c),(c,d),(c,e),(e,d)}. A specific relation or instance, for example the relation of
node a to node b, can be denoted as l (a,b) (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
Sociometric notation: Social network data can also be presented in sociometric
notation. Hanneman and Riddle (2005) defined sociometric notation as simply, “a
rectangular arrangement of a set of elements” (Ch. 5, What is a matix? section).
Sociometric notation is typically displayed in the form of sociomatrices.
Sociomatrices: Sociomatrices, also referred to as datasets herein, are a collection
of columns and rows used to display the relationship between nodes. The matrix for the
graph depicted in Figure 1 is presented in Figure 2 below. Figure 2 represents an
adjacency matrix, which is perfectly square with the columns and rows representing the
actors—often denoted as an n x n matrix (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). According to
Hanneman and Riddle (2005), “network data in their purest form” (Ch. 1, Introduction
section) is structured as an adjacency or n x n matrix. However, rectangular data arrays—
rows represent actors and columns represent attributes—are also considered network data
matrices (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
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Note: Exported from Ucinet 6 cited as Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002.

Figure 2: Binary adjacency matrix for Figure 1.

Dataset: Herein the term dataset has been adopted to refer to rectangular data
matrices as well as adjacency matrices. A dataset is assumed to be rectangular unless
specifically defined as a square adjacency matrix.
Research Questions
It is proposed that the IASB’s governance network is marked by an intentional,
elaborate network structure based on authoritative control via governance charters and
other such administrative ties. If inter-organizational relationships act as purposeful
social mechanisms embedded within a given governance network to coordinate and
safeguard exchanges, then the governance network of the IASB should exhibit specific
characteristics. To this point it is supposed that the IASB’s governance network structure
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is highly dense, lowly centralized, and notably structurally embedded (Granovetter, 1992;
Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997).
Social network analytics were employed to determine the structural properties of
the IASB’s governance network. This objective was focused by the following research
questions:
I.) Which organizations constitute the IASB’s governance network when defined in
terms of social network theory and how are these organizations hierarchically
arranged?
II.) What professional perspectives are represented by the individual actors within the
IASB’s governance network?
III.) What geographic locations are represented by the individual actors within the
IASB’s governance network?
IV.) To what extent are the strategic members of the IASB’s governance network
structurally embedded as measured by relational ties such as co-directorship,
employment or board memberships?

Significance of the Study
The purpose of positive analysis of the structural forces underlying international
accounting regulation is to contribute insights which may be used by the public,
politicians, and scholars alike to conceptualize the totality of international accounting
regulation. However, many stakeholders shy away from accounting discourse because
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they perceive it to be too complex or too technical for full appreciation by nonaccountants (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). It is in part this ignorance gap that has
facilitated the IASB’s hushed domination over international accounting regulation and
conceivably the more menacing prospect of outside domination over the IASB. Thus, this
work presents a significant contribution to accounting scholarship since it omits much of
the practical technicality of prior discourse on accounting convergence and is geared
toward all interested parties. Technical accounting jargon is limited or presented in such
as way as not to detract from the conclusions. However a uniform littering of acronyms is
unavoidable. For these reasons an appendix is provided to aid the reader.
If nothing else, it is time for the broader stakeholders of financial markets to
rethink the ordre naturel of capitalistic policies and examine the superstructural forces
embedding such policies within global society. Although this work makes no
recommendations for collection action per se, it is significant to note that scholarly
inquiries can, and consequently do, inform such actions. The average taxpayer or investor
is as affected by accounting regulations as an illiquid financial institution or an
accounting professional. Currently, nearly all stakeholders of the financial system are at a
crossroads. In that, the relatively unattended global governance system does not inform
the onslaught of unprecedented events demanding immediate attention by broader
stakeholder groups, who often lack general knowledge of an often obscured accounting
regulatory environment.
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It is imperative that scholars, governments, and interested parties diligently
examine the IASB’s progression to ensure that often conflicting interests are regarded
with positive consideration. Considering the ambiguous state of international accounting
regulation, exploring the emerging governance network structure of the IASB seems to
be of urgent concern (Kingsbury et al., 2005). This urgency is deduced from the
exponential rate in which international accounting has infiltrated the global financial
system during the last decade; yet, a basic identification of the stakeholder structure and
its impact on accounting regulation is notably absent from current literature. Of first and
foremost concern is mapping the structure of this governance network.
The exploratory nature of this dissertation symbolizes one of the first endeavors to
holistically define the broader governance network influencing accounting convergence,
whereby recognition is the first step toward active involvement. In particular, the
significant contribution herein is an empirical definition of the organizations which
constitute the IASB’s governance network. Moreover, supplementary conceptual details
about the governance network are offered in hopes that future research will build on these
efforts.
In sum, the technical aspect of this work is meant to engage accounting
researchers. On the other hand, the attempted neutrality of this work is an effort to bridge
technical gaps and inform, possibly engage, various interested stakeholder groups, who
may or may not be interested in the technical craft of accounting; but who possess a
vested interest in global society. Finally, the expected societal benefit is to encourage
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discourse by both groups about the diversity of representation in accounting regulatory
processes with both macro and micro consequences.
Summary and Overview
The recurring theme behind the construct of globalization seems to be economic
interconnectiveness (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; OECD, 2005;
Sirgy et al., 2004). The goal of promulgating IFRSs is undoubtedly to foster global
economic interconnectiveness on an unprecedented scale (Nicolaisen, 2005; Ruder et al.,
2005). Through formal and informal cooperative agreements the IASB has been grated
global authority for this monumental event. Increasingly issues related to the IASB’s
organizational structure are being noted by critical scholars (Brown, 2004, Hopwood,
1994).
The purpose of accounting convergence has always been economic betterment
(Nicolaisen, 2005; Tweedie, 2005). This intent; however, does not guarantee uniform
economic betterment or even the efficacy of economic betterment in general. In fact,
many notable works suggest just the opposite (Anwar, 2002; Fenelon & Murguía, 2008;
UN, 1987). Further questioning such claims may be forthcoming in the wake of the U.S.
credit crisis.
To conceptualize the IASB’s stakeholders principal-agent theory and legitimacy
theory are reviewed in chapter 2. Social network theory is also detailed. Following this
theoretical framing the IASB’s governance network is identified using an ego-centric
sampling technique derived from social network theory. The research design based on
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social network methodology is developed in chapter 3. The results for each of the four
research questions are presented in chapter 4. Finally, these results are discussed followed
by concluding remarks in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Scholarly research databases were searched to find literature pertaining to
stakeholder theory, global administrative law, social network theory and accounting
convergence. These topics served as the initial search terms. This search yielded many of
the sources included here as well as additional search terms and subject areas. Moreover,
the citations provided within selected literature were also utilized to contribute to this
work.
Kingsbury et al. (2005) argued that international accounting regulation occurs
within a global administrative space. One imperative consequence is that many aspects of
global administrative law—creation, enforcement, and regulation to name a few—cannot
be effectively addressed at a singular nation-state level. For this reason the global sphere
is becoming increasingly reliant on transgovernmental organizations such as the IASB to
create, monitor, and implement global regulations (Lehman, 2005b). Thus the global
administrative space for accounting regulation is subsequently defined and its
characteristics are discussed.
When delegation of accounting regulation is made to a private agent such as the
IASB, Mattli and Buthe (2005a) suggested that, “…one group of stakeholders will
inherently benefit from delegation at another group’s expense” (p. 405). Once democratic
control is disabled the questions of stakeholder interest and influence become of critical
importance. To understand the effects of stakeholder interest and influence, stakeholder
theory and legitimacy theory were triangulated. In particular, a modified P-A theory
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which builds on the work of Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 2005b) was juxtaposed with
Deegan’s (2006) legitimacy theory. Neither theory, individual or in total, is sufficient to
examine the underlying structural and/or superstructural features of the IASB’s
governance network. Thus social network theory was introduced as a fitting handmaiden
theory to overcome such limitations (Granovetter, 1992; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley,
1997).
The remaining subsections are dedicated to describing the organizations
constituting the IASB’s governance network. Using an ego-centric sampling technique
the process begins with the focal organization or the IASB (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
The governance network is then expanded by reviewing formal documentation such as
organizational charters, bylaws, and articles of incorporation to include the organizations
holding express power to influence international accounting regulations. The governance
network is also expanded laterally to include other international standard setting agencies
involved with accounting convergence. To add conceptual richness a brief overview for
each organizational actor is provided.
Global Administrative Law: A Global Space for Accounting
Accounting in the context of globalization is often presented in such broad
conceptualizations that it is of little substance. Hence research efforts must focus on the
“concrete and specific mechanisms” (Graham & Neu, 2003, p. 449) underlying this
nebulous of interaction. One such identifiable mechanism is the process of creating
global administrative law. The study of global administrative law is in its infancy. Global
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administrative law is defined by Kingsbury et al. (2005) as:
…comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social
understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global
administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of
transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing
effective review of the rules and decisions they make. (p. 17)
Global administrative law is becoming increasingly important as societies become
increasingly interdependent and traditional geographic boundaries are replaced by
electronic unity. Areas of global interest include security, environmental protection,
banking, financial regulation, law enforcement, labor standards, and humanitarian aid to
name a few (Kingsbury et al., 2005, p.16).
A global reach is deemed essential to effectively address the scope of the
aforementioned areas in what could be deemed the world state or as Kingsbury et al.
(2005) coined a global administrative space. The term global administrative law is
confined and generally accepted here to include pronouncements, decrees, standards, and
the like from global administrative bodies that have the ability to bind public and private
parties in matters of global governance (Kingsbury et al., 2005).
Absent some sort of regulatory cooperation national bodies are overtly
insufficient to address the emerging trend of global homology. In response, transnational
administrative bodies have been established to remedy these insufficiencies as well as to
erode the margins between national and global barriers (Kingsbury et al., 2005). These
administrative mechanisms are not limited to formal governmental or intergovernmental
bodies. Instead, private regulatory bodies such as the IASB are becoming important
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contributories to the growing form of global administration (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a,
2005b). In fact, Cassese (2006) cautioned researchers to avoid the common view that
global administrators are by default intergovernmental. Deductively, the introduction of
nongovernmental global administrators alters customary notions, such as traditional
democratic processes and governmental controls, of national administrative law
(Kingsbury et al., 2005).
Mattli and Buthe (2005a) asserted that the delegation of governance over
international accounting standards to a private body, the IASB, is the most significant
economic and political example of non-regulatory global administrative law. If so, it is
questioned here how global regulatory functions are carried out by the IASB. The IASB’s
nongovernmental, privately funded organizational structure poses significant threats to
traditional regulatory controls (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Perry & Nolke, 2006). In many
instances global regulators, in particular nongovernmental organizations like the IASB,
lack numerous procedural safeguards, such as accountability, oversight, participation in
the standard setting process, and transparency of the decision making process, found in
domestic administrative law (Steward, 2005).
It cannot be argued that the IASB fills an integral, indeed necessary, role in the
globalization of accounting technologies (Lehman, 2005b). However, it would be in error
to justifying their existence as an administrator of global administrative law based on the
economic logic of market efficiency alone (Hopwood, 1994; Lehman, 2005b). That is,
accounting convergence does not always provide customary economic benefits to the
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communities that it purports to serve (Caramanis, 2002). Or, that international accounting
regulation is by default a fair and inclusive process. Instead as Lehman (2005b) observed
it is time to address how effectively these, “accountability relationships between
organisations [sic] and society satisfy the objectives of a civil society” (p. 2).
Nevertheless, the application of global administrative law to accounting
regulation is the most viable alternative at present. As Kingsbury et al. (2005) stressed
accounting regulation requires extensive technical expertise which naturally imposes
some limitations on participation. In this sense global regulation must be streamlined by
powerful and decisive entities in order to function effectively. For example, a global
regulation is only binding when and if a nation state decides to enforce it. For these
reasons it is advantageous to utilize existing theory to scrutinize those responsible for
accounting regulation in the global administrative space.
The IASB and Stakeholder Interest
It is generally accepted that the behavior of an organization is largely determined
by the interest and level of influence of its stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). This
conceptualization is particularly salient in the arena of accounting regulation considering
that regulation has been delegated to, or assumed by, nongovernmental stakeholder
groups. Therefore, many accounting scholars seek to explain accounting regulation as a
function of inter-related stakeholder claims (Brown, 2004; Brown et al., 2004; Buthe &
Mattli, 2005; Mattli and Buthe, 2005a, 2005b).
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In this respect, stakeholder theory strives to balance the demands of various and
often competing stakeholder groups in order to determine the priorities of an
organization. In the broadest sense a stakeholder is defined as, “any group or individual
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (Freeman,
1984, p. 25). It is supposed that widely utilized narrow definitions are mandated by the
limitations of traditional sociological analysis. For a comprehensive overview of
stakeholder definitions see Freeman (1984) or more recently Rowley (1997). For
example, as discussed in Freeman (1984) some definitions include only those groups to
which the organization has a legally binding relationship. This implies that persons,
absent legal recourse, are not stakeholders in regard to fair and safe employment,
equitable exchanges, environmental disturbances, or health and welfare issues. In a
broader sense residents exposed to toxic waste, employees without recourse, and other
such persons directly impacted by an organization are clearly stakeholders whether or not
a legal claim can be exerted. Accordingly it is deduced here that the stakeholders of the
IASB assume a level of relative importance vis-à-vis the organization itself (Mattli &
Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). These stakeholders groups affect or possibly direct the
achievement of the IASB’s objectives (Jones et al. 1997; Rowley, 1997).
In skillful order Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 2005b) applied P-A theory to the
private regulatory structure of the IASB. P-A theory holds that one actor—the
principal—delegates decision making authority to another actor –the agent (Mattli &
Buthe, 2005b, p. 229). Further they theorized that:
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…turning to the practice of governance once authority is delegated, we have found
that, especially when delegation of governance functions is motivated by wanting to
benefit from the agent's prior expertise [in reference to the setting of technical
accounting standards], delegation to private agents creates a particular kind of
multiple principals problem, where the agent ends up with at least two principals—
one public and one private.
(Mattli & Buthe, 2005b, p. 232)
Vagueness about the public principal exists in the arena of international
accounting regulation. An issue diverted by Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 2005b). It is
questioned whether P-A theory, rooted in the traditions of economic and regulatory
contracts, can be suitably applied to the complex and ambiguous milieu of the IASB
(Prosser, 2005). Although the application of P-A theory has considerable merit, in
particular its ability to isolate and quantify singular interests, straightforward
principal/agent relationships are methodologically problematic on many levels. This
conundrum is not wholly lost even by P-A theory proponents (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a,
2005b); but particularly noted by critical scholars (Alam, 2006). The appropriateness of
P-A theory is further troublesome as epistemological notions, such as complexity, gain
scientific acceptance (Geyer, 2003; Rowley, 1997).
The naturalistic philosophies of legitimacy theory claim to correct many of the
underlying epistemological and ontological troubles with P-A theory (Deegan, 2006). For
example, legitimacy theory presupposes a socially constructed reality both temporally
and spatially embedded (Deegan, 2006). In this respect legitimacy theory is squarely
compatible with the emergence of global administrative law. For example, Kingsbury et
al., (2005) described global administrative law as an emerging social structure to deal
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with the complexities of global regulation. Conversely, legitimacy theory postulates
normative judgments subjecting any inquiry to scrutiny, especially at the exploratory
stage (Deegan, 2006). Ascribing such normative values is beyond the intended purposes
here. In this respect, the objective basis of operational and/or financial viability posited
by P-A theory alleviates the need for normative measures.
A web of conflicting stakeholder interest is preferable to frame the IASB’s
network governance (Prosser, 2005). This approach is no less challenging in that the
powerful and respected methodologies necessary are, rather unfortunately, under-applied
in this area (Laughlin, 1999). Yet, as Rowley (1997) theorized social network analysis
provides, “…a mechanism for conceptualizing the simultaneous influence of multiple
stakeholders and predicting organizational responses to these forces” (p. 888). Further
Jones et al. (1997) posited that social network analysis, in particular “structural
embeddedness is critical to our understanding of how social mechanisms coordinate and
safeguard exchanges in networks…” (p. 924).
Social Network Theory
Koza and Lewin (1999) characterized alliance networks as referring to multiparty
alliances creating a network to facilitate multilateral transactions. Koza and Lewin argued
that these networks, “represent the old form of new organization” (p. 652) specially
equipped for handling the complex economic activity in modern times. Alliance networks
are far from haphazard; instead, purposeful integration into the network is facilitated by
social control mechanisms, either formal or informal (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jones
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et al., 1997). The existence of these networks is robustly supported in professional service
fields (Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquest, & Borgatti, 1998) as well as, not
surprisingly, the accounting profession itself (Koza & Lewin, 1999).
The development of structural networks in traditional organizational theory can be
traced back to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) influential work on isomorphic processes.
DiMaggio and Powell’s theory, empirically well-supported, supposed that Weber’s (as
cited by DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) concept of bureaucratization, or organizational
rationalization, was instead structuration of organizational fields. DiMaggio and Powell
(1983) defined organizational fields as, “those organizations that, in the aggregate,
constitute a recognized area of institutional life…[and once organizational fields are
structured]…powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more similar to one
another” (p. 148). Such homogenization is achieved through isomorphic processes. In
particular, they noted two types of isomorphism—competitive and institutional. The welldocumented former emphasizes market competition, whereas the latter emphasizes
political power and institutional legitimacy (p. 150).
The concept of purposeful social networks bears a striking resemblance to the
idealization of global administrative regulatory structure (Kingsbury et al., 2005).
Although Kingsbury et al. stopped short of social network theory, they explicitly warned
that global administrative law is not substantive rules; but the operating processes making
such rules possible. The pronouncements in this context are of less importance than the
structures with the power to bind the global world. To illustrate Kingsbury et al. (2005)
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noted:
Some of the most dense regulatory regimes have arisen in the sphere of economic
regulation: the OECD networks and committees, the administration and the
committees of the WTO, the committees of the G-7/G-8, structures of antitrust
cooperation, and financial regulation performed by, among other, the IMF, the Basel
Committee and the Financial Action Task Force. (p. 18-19)
The aforementioned comments are significant on multiple levels. Firstly, the
authors explicitly supported the existence of rationally structured financial regulatory
regimes. They do not intend that the formation of these networks is random. On this point
they proposed that coordinated regulation is “often the very purpose…in fields such
as…financial practices” (Kingsbury et al., 2005, p. 23). Secondly, is the authors’ use of
social network terminology, perchance inadvertently, such as dense, networks, and
structures of financial regulation. Thus marrying global administrative law to social
network methodology is nearly effortless.
Ultimately networks of financial regulation are theoretically defined as
governance networks. Jones et al. (1997) specified that exchanges within governances
networks are patterned, neither uniform nor random, in that the patterns define conditions
within governance forms. Furthermore that analyzing such patterns can be used to
empirically define governance network structure. Rowley (1997) also supposed the utility
of using patterns to detect the influence of network structure. In particular, both posited
the constraining effects of a highly dense, embedded network structure. Although the
foundations of these propositions are different—the former calls on transaction cost
analysis while the later on stakeholder theory—the underlying use of social network
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theory is cohesive.
DiMaggio and Powell (1990) specified that organizational fields cannot be
defined a priori. Furthermore the authors proposed four criteria to define organizational
fields which are harmonious with global administrative regulation structure (Kingsbury et
al., 2005) as well as stakeholder network theory (Rowley, 1997). Thus the remainder of
this section is dedicated to defining the IASB’s governance network based on DiMaggio
and Powell’s criteria. The process begins with the focal organization or the IASB.
One of the four criteria for structuralization is, “…the emergence of sharply
defined interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition” (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1990, p. 148). Since identifiable ties of authority—decision making,
monitoring, voting or other such powers—are sharply defined, it is argued that the
presence of such ties merits inclusion into the governance network (Jones et al., 1997).
Additionally, however, affiliated organizations are weighted in relation to the remaining
criteria: an increase in interaction, information load, and awareness among the
participants (DiMaggio & Powell, p. 148). Based on the above criteria a governance
network is systematically developed below by considering the documented characteristics
of the IASB’s interorganizational ties.
Existing organizational data are examined to determine the appropriateness of
including organizational actors and/or individual actors into the IASB’s governance
network. Specifically, the criterion of authority, which is operationalized by analyzing the
organization’s governing body, informs this decision. Governing bodies are defined as
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the inner circle of authority guiding the organization’s strategic mission, appointing its
members or managing its operations. The specific focus is the structural network
providing operational and/or financial viability to the organizations involved with
international accounting convergence (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). Ironically these
criteria parallel the modus operandi of the Tripartite Group by looking through the, “legal
structure” and “focusing on the people who are actually managing” (BIS, 1995, p. 7).
Furthermore this position theoretically parallels R. Edward Freeman’s (1984) power and
stakes, Linton Freeman’s (1978) conditions of centrality, Deegan’s (2006) legitimacy
theory, and Bonacich’s (1987) measure of power.
Defining the IASB’s governance network
Multiple theoretical perspectives were considered above to outline the theoretical
underpinnings of the IASB’s governance network. Per stakeholder theory it is accepted
that stakeholder groups affect or possibly direct the achievement of the IASB’s
objectives. This assumption is furthered by P-A theory which holds that in the face of
diverging interest the IASB will satisfy the stakeholders providing the greatest amount of
operational or financial viability (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b). However, both of the
aforementioned theories are ill-equipped to deal with the complex stakeholder
arrangement of the IASB. Consequently, the assumptions of stakeholder behavior were
accepted but the underlying assumption of a stable governance network which is
independent of its stakeholders was rejected. Instead, the governance network was
viewed in terms of legitimacy theory as a socially constructed reality both temporally and
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spatially embedded. Social network theory also holds that the underlying network is a
socially constructed entity that is situationally dependent on both time and place (Jones et
al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). In as much social network theory was used to harmonize
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory as it provided the methodological tools
necessary to document complex stakeholder relationships.
The following subsections are dedicated to defining the IASB’s governance
network. There are several methods for determining the governance network boundaries
or more simply the set of nodes which should be included in the governance network.
Some methods, such as the full network method and snowball method, require that all
actors and all measurable relationships be documented. Accordingly such methods are
time consuming, costly, and impractical, even when used in conventional survey research
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Beyond cost and convenience, the intent of the present
study was not generalization and/or prediction. Instead the intent was to explore how the
IASB is affected, perhaps constricted, by its governance network. Thus, selecting an
appropriate mix of nodes to capture the network’s boundaries properly was both central
and problematic when analyzing an open network system (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
The nodes will be selected using Hanneman and Riddle’s (2005) ego-centric
sampling approach which is consistent with Wasserman and Faust’s (1999) network
defining technique. To achieve a holistic approach, alter and lateral connections were also
considered. Hanneman and Riddle noted that this technique is useful for understanding
how individuals or organizations fit within a particular network.
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Particular emphasis was given to formal interorganizational control mechanisms.
These mechanisms are defined as formal structural agreements such as articles of
organization, bylaws, and unilateral accords. The reason for this focus is two-fold. First, a
network exists if it is evidenced by binding formal agreements (Wasserman & Faust,
1999). Second, unlike conceptual notions of authority, hierarchical arrangements
represent express authority. In fact, in an era of interwoven private-public authority these
arrangements are “…equivalent to classical legal relationships” (Habermas, 1991, p.
150).
The IASB: Focal Organization
Oversight of the IASB is provided by the International Accounting Standards
Foundation (IASCF, 2008c). The IASF Foundation is incorporated in Delaware as a
nonprofit organization. Although the IASF Foundation contends to have no explicit
power to interfere with IASB standard setting or to influence the agenda, it is manifestly
responsible for appointing IASB members, Standard Advisory Council (SAC) members,
as well as International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) members
(IASB, 2008b). The IASB’s organizational structure is presented in Figure 3 below.
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TAAG

IASF Foundation

Represented by 6
organizations

16 Independent Trustees
Appoint IASB, SAC and IFRIC members

SAC
More than 30 members from
various consistencies
Advise IASB on issues, priorities and
agenda issues

IASB
14 member board
Establishes standards for
international financial accounting

International Financial
Reporting Standards
(IFRS)

IASB—International Accounting Standards Board
IASF Foundation—International Accounting Standards Foundation
IFRIC—International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee
SAC—Standards Advisory Committee
TAAG—Trustee Appointments Advisory Group

Note: Adapted from organizational chart retrieved from
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/How+we+are+structured.htm.

Figure 3: Organizational Structure of the IASB.

IFRIC
12 member board from various
consistencies
Promulgate guidance on
established IFRS
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A simple majority of 9 IASB members appointed by approximately 16 IASF
Foundation trustees, who are nominated by the 9 trustees of the TAAG, hold virtually
perfect authority to enact global accounting regulations, which govern financial
transactions in over 100 countries (IASB, 2008a; IFACF, 2006). Regardless of expertise,
surly a group of this size is not as claimed by the IASB, “…representative of the world’s
capital markets and a diversity of geographical and professional backgrounds” (IASC,
2000, p. 12).
Due to the noted lack of transparency, such as nonrequirement of public
disclosure, there is no way to categorically reveal the number of constituency groups
influencing the IASB and to what degree they exert this influence. Pragmatically this lack
of transparency and democratic inclusion is itself troublesome (Brown, 2004; Hopwood,
1994, Lehman, 2005a, 2005b). Nonetheless, the IASB is a major regulator in a much
larger network of global financial regulation (Perry & Nolke, 2006).
In July 2008 the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation
issued a discussion paper proposing changes to the IASB’s constitution (IASCF, 2008d).
The forthcoming Trustees’ proposal is to: “…establish a formal link between the
organization [IASB] and a Monitoring Group” (IASCF, 2008c, p. 1) as well as,
“…expand membership of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to 16
members and add new guidelines regarding geographical diversity of the members of the
IASB” (IASCF, 2008c, p. 1). Specifically the proposal sets forth a rather comprehensive
review—in accordance to constitutional provision—of the IASB’s organizational
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structure to be conducted during the 2009 calendar year with recommendations to be
implemented in the 2010 calendar year. Intriguingly, the 2010 implementation of linking
to the Monitoring Group as well as the issue of IASB membership are attended to
separately from the overall review and have been scheduled for accelerated
implementation in January 2009.
The International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation’s Trustees
recognized that the IASB will become the “world’s accounting-standard setter” (IASCF,
2008c, p. 7). Moreover the Trustee’s proposal reaffirmed commitment to the IASB’s
fundamental premise of independence reinforcing, “confidence in its ability to set
standards in the public interest by helping to ensure that the creation of IFRSs is not
beholden to special interest” (IASCF, 2008c, p. 6). In absence of a single authority, such
as the SEC in the case of the U.S. standard setter, this role is proposed to be assumed by
the Mentoring Group. Reportedly, “its membership would include public authorities
generally charged with the adoption of financial reporting standards and international
organizations with a mandate that includes facilitating the development and effective
functioning of capital markets” (IASCF, 2008c, p. 10).
To attend to the questions proposed in the present study the IASB was considered
the focal organizational node. In addition, individual actors of the IASF Foundation,
TAAG, IASB board, SAC board, and IFRIC board were also included for actor-level
analysis. As stated above the Monitoring Group will assume overall authority for the
IASB in 2009. Therefore this relationship was used to vertically expand the IASB’s
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governance network.
The Mentoring Group
Although the Mentoring Group does not maintain an official public presence per
se, the IASFC (2008c) proposed that the membership for the Mentoring Group include:
(a) responsible member of the European Commission; (b) managing director of the
International Monetary Fund; (c) the chair of the IOSCO Emerging Markets
Committee; (d) the chair of the IOSCO Technical Committee (or vice chair or
designated securities commission chair…); (e) the commissioner of the Japan
Financial Services Agency; (f) the chairman of the US Securities and Exchange
Commission and; (f) the president of the World Bank. (p. 11-12)
Very little information is publically available concerning the Mentoring Group
except for claims of oversight by the accounting regulators themselves. It appears that the
concept of a regulatory oversight committee was conceived by the FSF, a BIS hosted
organization, in 2002 when the FSF recommended organized oversight of the IASB. Per
the FSF’s report (2002):
BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO evaluate International Accounting Standards (IASs)
developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and International
Standards on Auditing (ISAs) issued by the IFAC, in order to provide supervisory
input in the development of existing and new standards in areas of supervisory
interest. (p. 10)
Notwithstanding questionable origins, the Mentoring Group will assume authority
(approval) for all IASB Trustee appointments. The nomination process will be revised to,
“entitle the Mentoring Group to recommend candidates and provide other input” (IASCF,
2008c, p. 12). In effect the Mentoring Group will approve and consequently provide
performance reviews for all IASB Trustees. In turn, Trustees must provide annual written
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reports to the Mentoring Group. Trustees must further comply with mandatory periodic
as well as ad hoc meetings scheduled by the Mentoring Group. To cement such controls
the details of these arrangements will be evidenced in an official memorandum of
understanding between the IASB and the Mentoring Group (IASFC, 2008d).
Given the Monitoring Group’s forthcoming authority over the IASB these
organizations are discussed in turn. The Mentoring Group as well as its composite
organizations discussed below clearly satisfy the authority criteria for organizational
nodes within the IASB’s governance network. Additionally, the individual actors
exercising decision making authority, including executive board members, board of
governors, senior management, were included for actor-level analysis.
Financial Stability Forum. On August 12, 1999 the FSF issued its first
comprehensive report (FSF, 1999). With amazing efficiency the FSF quickly produced a
comprehensive report regarding the current landscape of global administrative law by
coordinating various efforts with the virtual who’s-who of international agencies. The
FSF is hosted by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Consistent with the
sometimes dodge-and-avoid concept of separate legal entity, the BIS claims no legal
and/or reporting ties to the FSF (BIS, 2008). However, the FSF is financing by, as well as
physically hosted at, the BIS. Unfortunately the BIS, in rather hypocritical disregard for
its financial disclosure transparency mantra, does not disclose information pertaining to
its hosted organizations in its annual financial reports. As a result the valuation of this
relationship is difficult, if not impossible, at present (BIS, 2008). Of particular note, is
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that this lack of transparency directly violates international financial reporting standard
IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements.
The official mandate of the FSF (2008a) is to evaluate issues affecting
international financial systems to “…identify and oversee action necessary to address
these” (para. 1) and to, “improve corporation and information exchange among the
various authorities responsible for financial stability” (para. 1). The FSF acts as the
clearing house, central authority, and strategic advisor for international financial
regulators (FSF, 2008a; FSF, 2008b). The FSF’s (2008b) serves as a semi-annual report
card evaluating the activity for virtually every international financial organization. The
March 2008 report detailed the activities of 20 organizations including those responsible
for regulating accounting convergence, most notably the IASB, IAASB, IFAC, and the
PIOB (FSF, 2008b).
In May 2008 the IASB created an Expert Advisory Panel (EAP) at the
recommendation of the FSF. This panel—limited to international regulators such as the
BIS, IOSCO, IAIS, FSF, and a handful of banking, securities and accounting experts—
convened to address valuation techniques as well as disclosures in illiquid markets
(IASB, 2008b). EAP committee interest seemed to transcend mere panel participation.
An audio recording of the EAP’s (2008) June 18th meeting suggested potential
irreconcilable tensions between the IASB and the FSF regulators. To this, bemoaning
IASB members rhetorically questioned whether immediate action on particular
accounting standards were being driven by the market, the regulators or by the IASB’s
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focus on due diligence processes. They replied that neither the accounting standard
setting bodies nor due diligence were the drivers. With apparent exasperation it is
insinuated that the IASB is driven by senior supervisors groups promoting so-called best
practices. The IASB board seemed to question the pressure to react quickly by publishing
authoritative guidance derived in such a manner.
One participant at the EAP (2008) meeting voiced concern that the IASB would
lose sight of is principle-based focus by catering exclusively to international regulators
and ignoring other user-based groups, effectively becoming a quasi-banking regulator.
Another IASB board member participant recalled previous pressured guidance—
specifically the 51% ownership requirement for consolidation—which garnered
overwhelmingly negative reactions from other user groups (EAP, 2008).
During the EAP (2008) meeting the IASB members were reminded that regulators
should be imposing the standards instead of standard setting bodies. An international
banking representative compared the current state of international regulation to that of the
Japanese market crisis. In his analogy the Japanese accounting standard setting board
would not comply and/or cooperate with international regulators in that it continued to
issue its own standards. As a result the Japanese standard setting body was subsequently
dismantled by political powers. Another participant furthered this apparent threat by
stating that Brussels—the hub of international regulation—was growing impatient with
the IASB; that there was a big world of political expectations outside of accounting; that
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the IASB’s response must be quick guidance before certain individuals in Brussels
become upset; and that this process was in fact reality (EAP, 2008).
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) operates under the auspices of the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS). Representing the world’s first international or global financial institution the BIS
was founded in 1930 as part of the Young Plan. Pursuant to the Young Plan, the BIS was
established to administer German reparation payments from World War I. German
reparations were financed through international loans, otherwise known as Dawes and
Young Loans, and the BIS served as the acting trustee for these loans. In as much, the
BIS administered the first pot of truly global funds (BIS, 2008).
The BIS’s positioned strengthen as its services became increasingly valuable in
light of global instabilities such as the Second World War, the oil crisis of the 1970s, the
international debt crisis of the 1980s and the Asian crisis of the 1990s. As national
economies became progressively more interdependent a global interest vested in
controlling, or at least minimizing, the impacts of such crises (BIS, 2008). In response the
G-10 countries—Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States—created the BCBS. The BCBS’s goal
was to create standardized international banking regulations to be applied at the national
level by member countries. In July of 1988 the first international banking regulations,
known as the Basel Capital Accord, were adopted by G-10 countries (BCBS, 1988).
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Subsequent revisions to the Basel Capital Accord are presently codified in the Basel II
(BIS, 2008).
The BIS is owned by the world’s central banks, notwithstanding a heavy
percentage of shares in western countries. In 2001 86% of BIS shares were owned by
central banks. The remaining 14% were chiefly owned by large, international financial
institutions such as Goldman Sachs, J. P. Morgan, and the like (Meltzer, 2000). That year
the BIS unilaterally recalled all privately owned shares. What followed was a rare public
outrage by certain private shareholders about what they perceived was a less than
equitable call price. Beyond this dispute; however, Reginald Howe, an obviously gilded
investor, sued a powerful network of actors for undervaluing the private share call price
and conspiring to inflate global gold prices. This network included the BIS; Chairman of
the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan; President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, William McDonough; J. P. Morgan Chase; Chase Manhattan Corp.; Citigroup,
Inc.; Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; Deutsche Bank; Lawrence Summers, and; Paul
O’Neill, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (Howe v. BIS, 2001).
Although Howe’s case was dismissed, the nature of his accusations bears
mentioning. Of concern is Howe’s assertion that “the seventeen directors of the BIS
voted unanimously to adopt the mandatory share redemption plan” (Howe v. BIS, 2001,
p. 35). This fact, not disputed by the court, befalls a grand image of the small,
notwithstanding commanding, circle of shareholders directing the BIS. For example,
typical shareholder arrangements treat share repurchases as a significant organizational
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action requiring majority approval. The majority deciding such matters for the world’s
central bank is a mere 17 directors.
Authority for BIS operations rests with the Board of Directors (the Board). BIS
statutes provide that at least 11 of the Board’s members are appointed by ex officio
directors. The six ex officio directors are the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
U.S. Federal Reserve accompanied by the Governors of the central banks of Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Board delegates
considerable decision making authority to the Executive Committee. The Executive
Committee, chaired by the General Manager, is thus accountable to the Board (BIS,
2008, June 30). Hence the Board as well as the Executive Committee will be included for
actor-level analysis.
European Commission. The administration of the European Union is set forth in a
number of treaties which establish the framework for three administrative bodies
(EUROPA, 2008b). The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament
jointly serve as representative governing bodies for the EU member nations with both
judiciary and legislative authority. The European Commission (EC) acts as the main
executive body with the right to pursue legislation as well as to monitor and enforce the
implementation of enacted legislation (EUROPA, 2008a). In 2007 the EU administration
proposed amendments to the EU Treaties (EU, C306, 2007). In particular the
amendments established a united European Capital Market subsequently bound not only
by national but also international standard setting agencies. Further they permitted the EC

60

to enter into agreements on behalf of its member nations (EU, C306, 2007). Effectively
the powers of the EC were extended creating, “a single legal personality for the Union”
EUROPA, 2008c, section 4, para. 1) in order to, “strengthen the Union’s negotiating
power, making it more efficient on the world stage and a more visible partner for third
countries and international organizations” (EUROPA, 2008c, Section 4, para. 1). In this
the EC is noted to, “enjoy a substantial degree of independence in exercising its powers”
(EUROPA, 2008b, Section 3, para. 3).
Much of the advisory work on unification of EU national regulators as well as
their collective commitment to NGO regulation falls within the EC’s advisory
commission on civil society or the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC,
2008). The civil society framework is intended to unite EU policies and efforts given the
arduous history between many EU countries, their cultural and geographic diversity as
well as the divergent positions of national governments and parliaments (EC, 2008). To
bridge such gaps, or perhaps to expand traditional membership criteria, the EESC is
reported to represent Europe’s socio-occupational groups and other interest groups such
as international regulatory bodies. The EESC consists of 344 representatives nominated
by national governments and appointed by the Council of the European Union.
Membership is heavily slanted toward Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom
each allowed 24 representatives—approximately 28% membership. The next highest
allotments are 21 members each for Spain and Poland. In sum, these countries represent
40% of the EESC’s member population (EESC, 2008).
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The ECO Section operates within the EESC’s field of Economic and Monetary
Union. Specifically the ECO Section, “covers coordination of economic and monetary
policy, broad economic policy guidelines, stability and growth impact, enlargement of the
euro zone, and other issues relating to economic governance” (EESC, 2008, ECO
Section: Presentation). The ECO Section acts as a tireless mouthpiece for promoting the
EESC’s guidance on co-regulation toward a single European market (EESC, 2004;
EESC, 2005; EESC, 2008). More importantly Rule 29(2) of Rules of Proceedures—2006
as amended—provide near carte blanche authority for the ECO Section, or any EESC
committee for that matter, to deliver so-called own-initiative opinions on “…any question
pertaining to the European Union, its policies and their possible developments” (EESC,
2006b, p. 25).
The EC takes actions on EESC committee opinions and reports on such actions.
The EESC (2006a) boasts that more than two-thirds of EESC opinions are shown “due
regard [and]…their influence often goes beyond the limited scope of the Commission’s
proposal being examined in a Committee opinion” (No. 7). This is an apparent reference
to the power of own-initiative opinions—approximately 15% of EESC’s (2006a)
opinions in 2006. It appears that EESC opinions receive particular attention and regard by
EU regulators (EUROPA, 2008a). Thus the EESC, in particular the ECO Section,
provides explicate oversight to the IASB as well as express influence over EU regulators.
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International Association of Insurance Supervisors. The International Association
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) was established in 1994 to promote an international
framework for the regulation of financial insurance markets. Like the IASB, the IAIS
(2005a) develops standards and guidance for the insurance markets as well as,
“…encourages the implementation and practical application” (p. 1). At present the IAIS
boost membership from over 190 jurisdictions in nearly 140 countries (IAIS, 2007).
The IAIS promulgates supervisory papers to create standardized supervisory
regimes for a global insurance market (IAIS, 2007, p. ii). This culminates into a three tier
solvency structure. Level 1 is the preconditions of solvency assessment including risk
assessment and management; financial valuation and reporting, and; setting regulatory
requirements. The structural elements in Level II are concerned with developing
governmental regimes for implementation of IAIS standards at the national level. It goes
to follow that governmental monitoring as well as public disclosure to ensure compliance
are structural elements at Level III (IAIS, 2005b). In sum, the IAIS prescribes in finite
detail the overarching principles of insurance; a professional code of conduct; risk
assignment methodologies and mandatory testing procedures; obligatory transaction
analytics; institutional capital requirements as well as; financial reporting and disclosure
requirements (IAIS, 2008).
Officially the IAIS is organized as a legally separate nonprofit organization
domiciled in Basel, Switzerland (IAIS, 2005a). Upon evaluation of financial and
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operational viability; however, it appears that the IAIS operates as a legally separated
committee for the BIS. These ties to the BIS, albeit significant, are obscured at best. For
example, the IAIS was reorganized as a BIS hosted-organization in 1998 when its
physical operations and financial viability were assumed by the BIS (BIS, 2008).
According to the 2001 annual financial report the Swiss government provided over
$350,000 in financing to relocate IAIS headquarters from Washington, DC to the BIS
compound in Basel (IAIS, 2002).
Actually IAIS activities prior to the 1998 relocation are speculative. The first
publically available IAIS annual financial report is for the 2000 fiscal year in which
revenues are reported to be just over $1 million. Per the 2000 annual report the IAIS
subcommittees were not formally structured and/or operational (IAIS, 2001). This is
contrasted with the 2006 annual financial reports in which reported revenue is in excess
of $4 million and over 15 subcommittees and joint ventures reported vigorous and
aggressive activity (IAIS, 2007). Considering this sudden increase in activity, the lack of
financial disclosure, or public disclosure for that matter, by both the BIS and the IAIS is
concerning. The value of BIS funding to the IAIS is vaguely addressed in the following
financial statement disclosure:

64

4. BENEFITS RECEIVED
The Association is hosted by the Bank for International Settlements, Basel, and
benefits from administration, accounting, office space and other advisory services
provided by the Bank for International Settlements. The Bank for International
Settlements also administers a staff pension scheme of which a number of IAIS staff
are entitled to membership. The Association also benefits from members' secondment
of staff to its Secretariat. The total amount of the above benefits has not been
determined.
(IAIS, 2007, p. 21)
Lack of transparency should not be confused with lack of regulatory power as the
IAIS promulgates the international standards for insurance supervisory regimes. In so far
as accounting standard affect such regimes, “the IAIS provides input to the International
Accounting Standards (IASB) for its work on the international financial reporting
standards most relevant to insurers, and is a member of the IASB’s Standards Advisory
Council…” (IAIS, 2007, p. iv). The term input can be translated into monitoring once one
considers the IAIS’s hierarchical position within the Monitoring Group (IAIS, 2007).
Thus the IAIS as well as its executive committee were included for analysis.
International Organization of Securities Commissions. The International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSOC) is recognized as the international
standard setter for securities markets” (IOSOC, 2008b, Historical Background). The
IOSOC evolved from the inter-American regional association in 1983 when 11 securities
regulators from the Americas ratified the transformation. International membership
followed in 1984 when securities regulators from France, Indonesia, Korea, and the
United Kingdom joined the IOSOC. At present IOSOC members represent over 90% of
the world’s securities markets (IOSOC, 2008b).
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In 1998 the IOSOC published a comprehensive set of objectives and principles.
This collection is meant to standardize stock market regulation. Standardization alone;
however, falls short of good governance. To test whether member nations were in
compliance a comprehensive measurement system was adopted in 2003 (IOSOC, 2008b,
IOSOC Historical Background). Additionally, to pave the way for standardization as well
as monitoring the IOSOC adopted a memorandum of understanding in 2002 (IOSOC,
2008b). The memorandum of understanding provides mechanisms in which the IOSOC,
“… can ensure compliance with, and enforcement of their securities and derivative laws
and regulations” (Multilateral MOU, 2002, p. 2) or with IOSCO principles. Effectively
the IOSOC principles set forth a standardized regulatory framework for securities and
derivative markets in member nations. The measurement system is used to judge
compliance with the prescribed principles as well as establish action plans to correct any
deficiencies. And the memorandum of understanding allows nearly unlimited access to
national data with which to enforce the former two agreements.
As in any case of global administration, creating a standardized regulatory
environment among nation members with diverse governmental, regulatory, and political
environments is challenging for the ISOCO. Like its sister regulators the ISOCO is
achieving success through structural realignments and fruitful cooperative arrangements
within an international regulatory network. Naturally this scheme hinges on the internal
structure of the ISOCO itself.
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The ISOCO operated as a nonprofit organization domiciled in Canada until 2007
when it relocated to Madrid, Spain where it operates under the Law 55/1999 (ISOCO,
2008a). Ostensibly the President’s Committee, consisting of representative from all
member and associate member regulatory agencies, is endowed with the powers to
achieve ISOCO’s objectives. In effect these powers have been delegated to an Executive
Committee of 20 appointed members which, “takes all decisions and undertakes all
actions necessary or convenient to achieve the objectives of the ISOCO” (ISOCO, 2008a,
p. 34). Thus the broad representation of over 100 members from as many countries
purported by the President’s Committee is more or less diverted to the 20 members of the
Executive Committee.
The ISOCO’s interest in accounting convergence stems from the standardization
of accounting valuations usually set forth in accounting standards. The ISOCO has
adopted an active role—legitimized through the Monitoring Group—in the
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of IFRSs by its member as well as
potential member nations (ISOCO, 2008a). The ISOCO’s work is largely conducted
under the auspices of two working committees; Technical Committee and Emerging
Markets Committee both of which contribute to the functional area of disclosure and
accounting. Actually, it appears that the work of such committees is as influential in the
process of accounting convergence as the accounting standard setting boards themselves.
Or, as stated in the ISOCO 2007 Annual Report (2008a):
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The Technical Committee, via the standing committee, continues to be involved in
monitoring and supporting the work of the international accounting standard setting
bodies. These include the various projects being undertaken by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the work of IFAC´s International Auditing and
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) on clarifying the development of International
Standards of Audit and the activities of other bodies including the International
Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) and the International Ethical
Standards Board for Accountants. IOSCO believes that international audit standards
that contribute to high quality audits are important for securities regulators and
essential to maintaining investor confidence, so it continues to monitor the work by
the IAASB on producing new updated standards. (p. 20)
The ISOCO (2008a) committees have also been engaged to provide the in depth
information necessary to mange a truly global finance network. Their research
contributions focus on private equity in general and collective investment schemes in
particular. The fruit of these labors is to dictate future accounting regulations. For this
reason ISOCO as well as the members of the three aforementioned committees were
included for analysis.
World Bank. The World Bank is a parent organization to five subsidiary entities,
which are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation, The
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and International Center for
Settlements and Disputes (ICSD). The IBRD and the IDA represent the most noteworthy
subsidiaries through which the vast majority of World Bank’s funding transactions are
conducted (World Bank, 2007).
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The powers of the World Bank are expressly delegated to the Board of Governors
which is the “senior decision-making” body (World Bank, 2008, About Section). The
Board of Governors is comprised of a governor and an alternative governor from each of
the 166 to185 member countries depending on the specific subsidiary—IBRD or IDA.
This arrangement; however, is yet another illusion of proportionate voting power. In
reality the World Bank’s bylaws reposition virtually all functional operational powers by
delegation to a small group of executive directors appointed by the Board of Governors
(World Bank, 2008).
In essence the power of the Board of Governors is limited to maintaining the
internal organizational structure of the World Bank such as admitting/suspending
member countries, capital stock authorizations, amending official articles or bylaws, and
organizational realignments. Of these responsibilities special privacy is given to
structural alignments via organizational amendment. Amendments to the Bank’s Articles
of Agreement require 85% majority of the total voting power. Given that the United
States holds approximately 15% voting power any such structural realignments are
susceptible to US veto power (World Bank, 2008).
The Board of Governors appoints 24 executive directors to conduct and approve
daily operations. Of the 24 directors, 5 are appointed by the countries with the largest
number of shares—United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, and France. The
remaining 19 members are elected by the remaining member countries. The executive
directors can be delineated into two respective boards by virtue of appointment or
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election. Specifically the World Bank claims that, “the resident [5 appointed members]
Board of Directors (the Board) represents the evolving prospective of member countries
on the role of the bank as well as its operational experience” (World Bank, 2007, p. 6).
All subsequent references are to the board which by implication is the resident 5 member
board. The board is reported to, “consider and decides [sic] on the IBRD loan and
guarantee proposals and IDA credit, grant, and guarantee proposals made by the Bank’s
president” (World Bank, 2007, p. 6). The remaining executive directors fill the, as
officially described, important role of guiding the general operations of the Bank (World
Bank, 2007). Further the executive directors appoint officers responsible for daily
management and decision making on the board’s behalf. Therefore, the 24 executive
directors as well as the appointed senior officers were included for analysis (World Bank,
2007).
The International Accounting Regulators
A host of international NGOs influence accounting convergence including the
establishment of IFRSs by the IASB. International financial reporting standards only
represent the technical reporting framework of accounting convergence. The scope of
accounting convergence is primarily achieved by three separate regulatory bodies. In
addition to accounting standards promulgated by the ISAB, boards under the auspices of
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) promulgate standards on auditing,
education, and ethical conduct.
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Augmenting the hierarchical approach employed above, a lateral approach was
also utilized to define the IASB’s governance network. The efficacy of any social
network approach is the ability to fully model a phenomenon (Wasserman & Faust,
1999). The phenomenon in question, accounting convergence, is co-regulated through
three standard setting bodies—IASB, IAESB, and IAASB. Further the accounting
profession itself is regulated by two additional standard setting bodies or the IESBA and
the IPSAB. The relational properties of the decision making authorities of the lateral
standard setting boards are also used to expand the social network and included for
analysis. Interestingly the lateral standard setting boards were recently realigned the fall
under the newly created international Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB). Hence the
following lateral agencies were also included in the IASB’s governance network.
Public Interest Oversight Board. Creation of the PIOB was forewarned by the
FSF in 2004. According to the FSF (2004b), “during 2004 a Public Interest Oversight
Board (PIOB) will be created by the IFAC Monitoring Group to oversee IFAC’s public
interest activities…the early establishment of PIOB, including the selection of its
members, is essential to fully implement the reforms” (p. 22). This statement is so
uncomplicated that it needs no further explanation.
Officially; however, the PIOB was formally founded by donations made by the
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Funding aside, the FSF (2005) reported
that the PIOB was, “…the result of a collaborative effort by the international financial
regulatory community” (p. 4). The mission of the PIOB is reported to be, “…to oversee
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IFACs auditing and assurance, ethics, and education standard-setting activities as well as
its Member Body Compliance Program” (PIOB, 2008a, Para. 2). The PIOB is granted
authority to review and evaluate IFAC activities; to oversee and approve IFAC
committee nominations; and to recommend IFAC action projects (PIOB, 2008a). Thus
upon creation the PIOB effectively assumed authority of IFAC governance and
membership.
The PIOB (2008b) has in their words “given final approval” to the “strategic
plans” (p. 4) of two of the three international accounting standard setting bodies.
Specifically the two boards mentioned are the IFAC boards responsible for International
Standards on Auditing (ISAs), IFAC Code of Ethics (the Code), and International
Education Standards (IESs) (PIOB, 2008b, p. 4). Consequently these boards exert
incredible influence over the whole of international accounting convergence as they
regulate the professionals practicing accounting as well as the auditing process.
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International Federation of Accountants. The IFAC claims to be the global
regulator of the accounting profession (IFAC, 2008b). At a broad level the IFAC strives
toward two overarching goals. Firstly, the IFAC polices the profession by maintaining
standards on accounting education, professional certification, and ethical conduct. Such
efforts are, according to the IFAC (2008b), for the creation of a worldwide accountancy
profession. An international accounting system is highly dependent upon accounting
professionals. Moreover, the IFAC is also responsible for promulgating international
auditing standards.
In 2007 the IFAC instituted a mass reorganization program aimed at clarifying
the, “decision-making framework for those involved in IFAC’s governance and
management structure” (IFAC, 2008a, Section 1). Much like the reorganizational efforts
detailed above, the IFAC’s reorganization expressly commits the IFAC to the emerging
governance network by infusing structural control mechanisms. In effect, the PIOB is
granted oversight and approval authority for the IAESB, IAASB, IAESB as well as the
IPSASB collectively known as “public interest activities” (IFAC Bylaws, 2006, Section
9.1). Although board member nominations are made by the Nominating Committee, the
PIOB has been granted the authority to approve all members (IFAC Bylaws, 2006,
Section 10). As a result final control of the IFAC standard setting members is effectively
assumed by the PIOB, who select from a pool of candidates proposed by the Nominating
Committee (IFAC Nominating Committee, 2008). Therefore the IFAC and its standard
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setting bodies are also indirectly controlled by the Mentoring Group. Accordingly, the
IFAC and its composite board were included for analysis.
Research Methods
At present little scholarly research has been published systematically categorizing
the organizational bodies involved with accounting convergence (Cooper & Robson,
2006; Perry & Nolke, 2006). Consequently working with an isolated collection of
mainstream variables or dominate methodological approach is inherently problematic.
Upon reviewing the five qualitative traditions noted by Creswell (1998)—biography,
grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenological study, and case study—only case study
methodology is suitable to provide a holistic representation of the broader stakeholder
groups to international accounting convergence. For example, phenomenology is well
suited for an in-depth examination of a particular phenomenon or event. In general a
phenomenological study examines a phenomenon from the perspectives of the
individuals or the collective meaning they ascribe to the phenomenon under study
(Creswell, 1998). There are; however, two major drawbacks with the use of
phenomenological study to achieve the present objectives. The first drawback is the
troublesome critiques of Harley, Hardy and Alveeson noted by Conklin (2007). In
particular, the various practices employed during the phenomenological reflective process
are particularly susceptible to subversion and skeptism. The second drawback of a
phenomenological design is also applicable to biographical and ethnographical research
designs; namely, that the research objectives of these designs focus on individuals within
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the event rather than the event itself. The research focus herein approached accounting
convergence from an organizational or structural level verses an individual level.
Case studies involve the study of a bounded system or case(s) (Creswell, 1998, p.
61). Yin (2003) defined a case study as an empirical inquiry that, “investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). It can be hardly
argued that accounting convergence is a contemporary phenomenon (Kingsbury et al.,
2005). Likewise Yin’s (2003) second criterion is also satisfied as clear boundaries
between the phenomenon—accounting convergence—and the context—stakeholders of
global administrative law—are easily blurred.
Case study methodology can be employed to examine “contextual conditions”
that are intimately related to the phenomenon (Yin, 2003, p. 13). In this way Yin
described a case study methodology as an “all-encompassing” and “comprehensive
research method” (p. 14). Furthermore, Yin expanded his definition of a case study to
include data collection as well as data analysis components. The following components
are also given by Yin.
First, a case study, “copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there
will be many more variables of interest than data points…” (Yin, 2003, p. 13). As noted
in the background information, the IASB operates in an ambiguous milieu virtually free
of traditional democratic controls (Kingsbury et al., 2005; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a,
2005b). Obviously this problem can be approached in multiple ways. To date a majority
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of approaches are more theoretical (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006; Hopwood, 1994;
Lehman, 2005b) or focused on specific relationships between variables (Aziz & McLeay,
2007; Brown, 2004; Caramanis, 2002). It was theorized that a systematic concentration
on structural aspects of the global regulators is necessary to illuminate the underlying
network driving accounting convergence. Clearly this is a distinctive situation with
multiple variables.
Second, a case study, “relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to
converge in a triangulating fashion…” (Yin, 2003, p. 14). A key issue is the nature and
type of evidence or data collected. Due to the inaccessible nature of the key participants,
who characteristically hold elite positions in geographically dispersed locations
internationally, evidence from existing data was preferable. Moreover no one data source,
such as survey research or interviews, appeared to be sufficient to create a holistic
contextual representation of the IASB’s governance network. In as much multiple sources
of evidence collected from various types of existing data—organizational bylaws,
incorporation articles, annual financial reports, press releases, minutes, reports,
communiqués, and other administrative documentation—were necessary (Yin, 2003).
Finally a case study, “…benefits from the prior development of theoretical
propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2003, p. 14). The entire milieu
of the IASB is overly complex for more traditional sociological analysis. Currently social
network analysis embedded within a case study may be the only framework capable of
defining the underlying network of stakeholders (Jones et al., 1997; Laughlin, 1995;
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Rowley, 1997). For example, Laughlin (1995) advocated the use of social network theory
which is capable of mapping complex stakeholder relationships.
Summary
As demonstrated the IASB operates in an ambiguous global administrative space
endowed with the international authority to promulgate regulation affecting a host of
interested stakeholders. Consequently this arrangement benefits some stakeholders at the
expense of other stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a). For example,
Perry and Nolke (2006) found that the IASB was able to rapidly prescribe accounting
standards with very little public debate or input. Although these findings are significant,
the IASB is just a small, nonetheless integral, part of the larger international network.
The IASB’s ability to resist stakeholder influence is a function of its relational ties
within the global accounting governance network. To tease out the IASB’s governance
network an ego-centric sampling procedure was employed above. During this process a
rich layer of conceptual details was added for each organizational actor. As the IASB’s
governance network has been sufficiently defined a case study research design utilizing
available data is developed in the next chapter. The results are then presented in chapter 4
and discussed in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction
To date mainstream accounting researchers have neglected social network theory
as a viable method for studying the superstructural forces behind the international
accounting regulators (Laughlin, 1999, 1995). An exception is Perry and Nolke’s (2005)
social network analysis of the IFAC and the European Commission. Although researchers
have successfully used social network methodology to explore international accounting
professional service networks (Koza & Lewin, 1999) and similar methodology to study
international accounting models (d’Arcy, 2007), these tool have not been fully utilized to
study international accounting regulators directly. One aspect of these superstructural
forces is the IASB’s governance network.
Jones et al. (1997) theorized that, “a phenomenon of the last 20 years has been the
rapid rise of the network form of governance” (p. 911). Rowley (1997) posited that the
structural characteristics of this governance network could be used to interpret and
predict the, “…simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders” (p. 887). To fill this gap
in accounting literature, a research design incorporating social network methodology is
set forth below to define and describe the IASB’s governance network.
Research Design
A case study framework incorporating social network data analysis was adopted
to explore and describe the IASB’s governance network. Specifically a holistic focus was
used to bind the network governance structure of the IASB and to determine if social
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mechanisms within the governance structure support this role (Jones et al., 1997; Rowley,
1997). These purposes are at once exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. Thus, a
pluralistic research design strategy was preferable to achieve these objectives.
The objectives are suited for case study research design. In particular, case study
methodology is increasingly used for exploratory and descriptive purposes such as this
(Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003). The IASB governance network was defined as the case
under study. Additionally, all data collected within the case were existing data. As
Singleton and Straits (2005) noted the abundance and variety of available data is only
limited by the researcher’s imagination.
Relying on existing data was preferable given the nature of this inquiry as well as
the inaccessibility of key participants (Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003). For the latter it would
be virtually impossible to interview or survey hundreds of high-level officials in a
suitable timeframe. Beyond this; however, other research designs are not well suited for
detecting network structure. The unit of analysis for survey research, for example, is
typically the individual and not the organizational structure (Singleton & Straits, 2005).
For the purposes of detecting network structure other field methods such as interviews
and questionnaires are costly to administer and inefficient. Moreover, the well
documented bias of these methods can be lessened by observing the organizational
structure apart from the individual experience (Gerlach, 1992; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley,
1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
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Accordingly social network methodology corrects many of the palatable
limitations of the aforementioned research designs. Doreian and Albert (1989) wrote that,
“among the exciting aspects of contemporary social network analysis is the potential to
combine quantitative and qualitative techniques in a complementary fashion” (p. 281).
Moreover, White, Boorman, and Beiger (1976) wrote, “…that the presently existing,
largely categorical descriptions of social structure have no solid theoretical grounding;
furthermore network concepts may provide the only way to construct a theory of social
structure” (p. 732).
Traditional data analysis based upon accepted theoretical underpinning is also
problematic. For example, P-A theory has considerable merit such as the ability to isolate
and quantify singular interests. However, straightforward principal/agent relationships are
methodologically problematic on many levels (Alam, 2006). Even P-A theory proponents
such as Mattli and Buthe (2005a, 2005b) acknowledged the limitation of using P-A
theory to render a larger network representation. The appropriateness of P-A theory is
further troublesome as epistemological notions, such as complexity, gain scientific
acceptance (Geyer, 2003; Rowley, 1997). Legitimacy theory, on the other hand, is more
amendable to the emerging scientific notions of complexity. Yet, legitimacy theory is
founded on normative judgments which detract from an objective empirical network
rendering. In sum, positivistic approaches such as P-A theory impose the assumptions
that this network is relevantly stable and situationally independent while institutional
approaches such as legitimacy theory inject normative measures. Both of these
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propositions were rejected here (Hoque, 2006). Obviously, empirically framing fluid
governance networks purposefully created by majority stakeholders contravenes
positivistic theoretical bounds and normative limitations (Alam, 2006; Hopper & Hoque,
2006).
It was accepted that social network methodology may present the only viable
method for constructing a theory of social structure (White et al., 1976). More
specifically, social network analysis was necessary to empirically construct and examine
the IASB’s governance network (Gerlach, 1992; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997;
Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Social network tools provide a method of examining the
underlying mechanisms of structuralization and professionalization commonly found in
the field of accounting (Aziz & McLeay, 2007; Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 1999;
Jones, Hesterly, Fadmoe-Lindquest, & Borgatti, 1998; Laughlin, 1995). The application
of social network methodology holds great promise in that many of these mechanisms
and structural arrangements are too complex for more traditional data analysis. Therefore,
social network data analysis was used to analyze the data collected for this case study.
For these reasons the use of case study methodology was cohesively coupled with
social network analysis (Jones, et al, 1997; Koza & Lewin, 1999). To refer to the
appropriateness of this methodological marriage Koza and Lewin (1999) noted that this
type of case satisfies the definition of a network; and the network the definition of a case
(Yin, 2003). Moreover, the network was formally constituted and organized by official
structural agreements usually in the form of incorporation documents. Thus, lucid

80

boundaries in terms of the case as well as the network structure were readily determinable
(Hanneman & Riddle, 1995; Rowley, 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999; Yin, 2003).
As defined in previous sections a social network, “…consists of a finite set or sets
of actors and the relation or relations defined on them” (Wasserman & Faust, 1999, p.
20). The entire governance network is therefore an aggregate of all actors or nodes. The
specific organizational nodes and actor-level nodes were defined in chapter 2 and
aggregated below. Essentially two views of the IASB’s governance networks were
created—one containing organizational nodes and one containing actor nodes. Data
pertaining to these views were transcribed into four datasets—one organizational dataset
and three actor datasets. Unique datasets for each research question are advisable given
the particularistic conclusions, measurements, requirements, and limitations of network
analysis methodology (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
The network data were measured against four variables—one variable per dataset.
The dataset containing the organizational actors were measured for the structural variable
of authority. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) criteria for structuration was used to define
authority. Specifically the presence of identifiable ties of authority, including decision
making, monitoring, voting, or other such powers, resulted in a directional authority
relationship.
Two actor-level datasets were measured against the composition variables of
professional affiliation and geographic location. Unlike structural variables which are
concerned with the relationship between pairs of actors, composition variables measure
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actor attributes (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). As Wasserman and Faust colorfully
described, “composition variables, or actor attribute variables, are of the standard social
and behavioral science variety…” (p. 29, emphasis original). Thus the variables of
professional affiliation and geographic location were examined to add further conceptual
details to the IASB’s governance network.
The fourth, and final, dataset measured the structural embeddedness of the
individuals within the network. This type of dataset and measurement technique formed
an affiliation network. The set of actors were measured against a set of events or
organizations to which the set of actors belong (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Affiliation
networks are expressly formulated to quantify the extent to which a subset of actors
interact or overlap with other actors or its structural embeddedness (Jones et al., 1997;
Wasserman & Faust, 1999). In this respect, affiliation networks emphasize the duality
between actors and events. Duality implies not only that actors are linked to events but
also that events are linked to the actors who constitute the event (Borgatti & Everett,
1989; Burt, 1976, 1987; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
The theoretical motivation for studying affiliation networks is to understand the
importance of individual memberships in collective activities. As early as the 1950s
Simmel recognized that group affiliations were fundamental in defining an individual’s
social identity (cited in Wasserman & Faust, 1999). As theoretical developments on
affiliation networks progressed a common thread emerged; namely, the premise that
actors interact through social events or settings to create an affective link among
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individuals (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
Overlapping, comembership, co-affiliation are typically defined in terms of an
actor and an event. For example, Gerlach (1992) examined the directorial interlocks of
companies sending directors to other companies using a social network block modeling
method. Gerlach’s study is unique in that interlocking was not restricted to a specific
event as much as it was deemed a cumulative property of the director’s former roles.
Given the particularistic nature of Gerlach’s study—Japanese cultural ties—as well as the
study herein—complex global governance—this longitutidual conceptualization is fitting,
perhaps necessary, to accurately portray isomorphic structuration (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983).
Hanneman and Riddle (2005) suggested multiple techniques for analyzing 2mode networks such as singular value decomposition (SVD), factor analysis, and
correspondence analysis. Although these methods can be successfully employed to
describe 2-mode data they are not particularly suited for binary data (Borgatti & Everett,
1997). Furthermore, these methods, also a form of matrix permutation analysis, do not,
“…indicate the boundaries between, or membership in, any subgroups that might exist in
the network” (Wasserman & Faust, 1999, p. 287). For these reasons, these methods did
not seem appropriate here and were not used.
The theoretical notion of cohesive subgroups, based on the concepts of distance or
density identify subgroupings or interconnectiveness within the larger organizational
network, were also considered for the data analysis of dataset4 (Borgatti, 2004; Borgatti
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et al., 1990; Everett & Borgatti, 1999, 1998; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). These methods
include techniques such as clique, n-clique, k-plex, and lambda set analysis. As Moody
and White (2003) wrote, “the ability to directly operationalize structural cohesion through
social relations is one of the primary strengths of a relational concept of social cohesion”
(p. 106).
The limitations of these techniques are that 2-mode data must first be transposed
into 1-mode data. In as much the methods used to examine cohesive subgroups are
designed to be applied directly to the relational ties between actors set up in a 1-mode
matrix. When 2-mode data is transposed into 1-mode data it captures the relationships
between a subset of actors—based on actor and event—instead of direct ties between
actors. As discussed below transforming 2-mode data in this way offers a proven method
to study affiliation data. However, great care must be exercised when using transposed 2mode affiliation data and applying analytical techniques designed for 1-mode data. Due
to issues in interpretation with these types of cohesive subgroup measures they were not
used in the present study (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005;
Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
It is important to note that 2-mode data is amendable to 1-mode analysis.
Transforming the data into 1-mode data allows researchers to study the ties between
actors and organizations, organizations and actors or both. This method is supported by
Wasserman and Faust (1999) and is particularly effective when both relations are studied
concurrently. To focus on the ties between actors and organizations the dataset can be
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transposed into a 1-mode comembership matrix. Conversely, to focus on the ties between
organizations and actors the dataset can be transposed into a 1-mode co-organizational
matrix. Incidentally these matrixes can be studied independently or concurrently;
however, concurrent examination enables a more complete understanding of both modes
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). In essence the product of transforming the data is a valued
1-mode matrix for each mode—actor and organization—that can be analyzed.
Accordingly, dataset4 was transposed to create a comembership overlap as well as a coorganizational overlap matrix that was used to interpret various measurements of
structural embeddedness. However, further processing—clique, n-clique, k-plex, and
lambda set analysis—of these matrices is inherently problematic as discussed above.
In sum, two social network techniques were applied to dataset4 to measure the
structural embeddedness of the IASB’s governance network. Specifically, the two
theoretical concepts appropriate to study affiliation networks were comembership overlap
and co-organizational overlap.
Population and Sampling Procedure
The theoretical population under study is the IASB’s governance network.
Governance networks are by definition, “…coordination characterized by informal social
systems rather than by bureaucratic structures with firms and formal contractual
relationships between them” (Jones et al., 1997). Obviously this definition is open to
interpretation. Thus, an ego-centric sampling technique was employed in the previous
chapter to (a) define the organizations bounded in the IASB’s network governance
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structure, (b) detail the logical processes, and (c) provide conceptual richness to each of
these organizations.
An ego-centric (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) or ego-centered (Wasserman &
Faust, 1999) network begins with a focal organization, the IASB in this case. Since the
network population or boundaries are unknown, measurable ties to the focal organization
were used to expand the network. Therefore, the relation of authority, defined as a
variable above, was used to expand the network. To achieve a holistic approach alter or
lateral connections based on organizational similarity to the IASB were also considered.
Hanneman and Riddle noted that this technique is, “…useful for understanding how
networks affect individuals [or focal organizations], and they also give a (incomplete)
picture of the general texture of the network as a whole” (Ch. 1, Ego-centric networks
section, para. 1).
When conceptualizing the relation of authority particular emphasis was given to
formal interorganizational control mechanisms. These mechanisms were defined as
formal structural agreements such as articles of organization, bylaws, and unilateral
accords. It is hardly debatable that a network exists if it is evidenced by binding formal
agreements (Jones et al., 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Furthermore, hierarchical
arrangements characterize express authority.
In the previous chapter the IASB’s governance network representing the
population—indentifying the organizational actors as well as individual actors—was
bound as the BIS, FSF, Mentoring Group, BCBS, European Commission, IAIS, IOSOC,
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World Bank, ISAB, IFAC, PIOB, IAESB, IAASB, IESB, and IPSAB. Collectively these
organizations represent the IASB’s governance network which is also the theoretical
population. The individual actors (N = 407) were selected based on the criteria of internal
decision making authority. In particular, these individuals included elite management as
well as organizational board members. Individual members were not included for the
European Commission or the Mentoring Group. Although the European Commission lists
hundreds of members for numerous financial regulatory boards and advisory bodies it is
uncertain how much authority these boards actually have to influence European law.
Additionally, the Mentoring Group does not publish a list of individual members. The
composition of individual actors within the governance network is detailed in Table 1
below.
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Table 1
Detailed Listing of the Individual Actor Population
Organization

Committee

IASB

TAAG

IASB

SAC

IASB

IASB Board

IASB

IASC Foundation

IASB

IFRIC

IASB

IASB Working Group

World Bank

WB Directors

World Bank

WB Officers

Bank of International Settlements

Board members

Bank of International Settlements

Executive Management

Bank of International Settlements

BCBS Members

Financial Stability Forum

FSF

International Association of Insurance Supervisors

Executives

Public Interest Oversight Board

Board members

International Organization of Securities Commissions

Executive Directors

International Federation of Accountants

Board members

International Federation of Accountants

Nominating Committee

International Federation of Accountants

IAESB Board

International Federation of Accountants

IAASB Board

International Federation of Accountants

IESBA Board

International Federation of Accountants

IPSASB Board

Total Individual Actors

No. of Members

9
42
15
27
16
34
24
24
17
11
22
27
12
10
19
21
4
19
18
18
18
407
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The ego-centric selection of the boundaries of this social network is theoretically
sound in that a priori populations are not specifically required (Hanneman & Riddle,
2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claimed that networks,
“cannot be determined a priori but must be defined on the basis of empirical
investigation” (p. 148).
Ego-centric sampling is complete when all relational ties have been exhausted or
the theoretical population has been defined. The latter was the case here. Specifically, the
selection of network nodes at the upper boundary of authority was halted at the BIS. The
only quasi-organizational groups found to be higher in authority than the BIS were
national finance ministers. Within the context of the BIS this authority is largely
concentrated in the G7 or G10 countries. Consequently inclusion of these authorities
forced inappropriate theoretical stretching of the relatively straightforward decision
making criteria (Bonacich, 1987; Boorman & White, 1976; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
Therefore, the BIS was assumed to be the supreme, at least in terms of financial leverage
and express hierarchical position, nongovernmental organization in the IASB’s
governance network. The lower boundary constraint of the focal organization itself was
supported by the decision making/authority criteria. Or, the IASB does not hold
downward authority for any other organization within the scope of the governance
network. Finally, the lateral boundaries were limited to other global accounting standard
setting organizations (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
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Data Collection Procedures
To guide data collection efforts Yin’s (2003) embedded case study guidance for
existing documentation analysis was followed. Existing data were used to define the
network nodes as well as to reconstruct relational ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
Relying on existing data was preferable given the exploratory nature of this inquiry
(Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003). Existing data were also practical due to the inaccessible
nature of the key participants, who characteristically hold elite positions in
geographically dispersed locations internationally. A protocol for data collection
procedures was implemented to foster repeatability and thus reliability and validity (Yin,
2003). Therefore only existing data as defined by the protocol were analyzed.
Data collection was guided by the data collection protocol presented in Table 2
below:
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Table 2
Data Collection Protocol for Analytic Data Matrixes
Purpose

Data Collection
Dataset1

Establish
Organizational Actor
Authority

Main source: bylaws, incorporation articles, and annual financial
reports.
Secondary source: official organizational documentation including
press releases, minutes, reports, communiqués, and other
administrative documentation.
Dataset2, Dataset3, and Dataset4

Establish Geographic
Representation,
Professional
Affiliations, and
Individual Actor
Embeddedness

Main source: bylaws, incorporation articles and annual financial
reports, official organizational documentation including press
releases, minutes, reports, communiqués, and other administrative
documentation.
Secondary source: non-administrative documentation including
publically available dossiers and media sources.

The data collected were transcribed to construct 4 datasets. Data pertaining to
organizational actors were coded into dataset1 whereas data pertaining to individual actors
were coded into dataset2, dataset3, and dataset4. All data collected were existing data from
either the main or secondary sources listed in Table 1. Preference was given to main
source documentation. Secondary sources were primarily used to validate main sources
and to augment gaps found in main source data. Nevertheless, in some instances
recordable data depended solely on secondary sources when such data were not reported
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in main sources. This conditionality was particularly marked in the data collection for
dataset2, dataset3, and dataset4. This data collection process should supplement the ties
reported in main sources, creating more comprehensive datasets for analysis.
Furthermore, such an approach mitigates the reliability bias of single source
documentation (Yin, 2003).
The organizational nodes (N = 15) were coded into dataset1 based on directional
ties of identified authority. This resulted in a binary 15 x 15 adjacency matrix that is
characteristically symmetric. Or, if the nodes are denoted as n1, n2, n3,…n15 the ith row is
identical to the ith column—simply row 1 column 1 is (n1,n1). A directional tie of
authority resulted in a binary code of 1 if present and 0 if absent.
The actor-level nodes were coded into dataset2 (N = 401) and dataset3 (N = 407).
Both datasets are asymmetric matrixes measuring the composition attributes of
geographic representation and professional affiliations. Or, the rows represent the set of
actors and the columns represent the measured attribute. The attribute of geographic
representation was transcribed as the self or other reported nationality of the actor. The
attribute of professional affiliation was coded into five professional perspectives. The
professional perspectives were categorized as, (a) national regulatory agency, (b)
accounting industry, (c) banking industry, (d) academia, and (e) other. A recordable event
for dataset3 was defined as an actor’s concurrent or previous employment, board
membership, committee memberships, or appointed positions in any of the
aforementioned professional fields. A non-directional, binary value of 1—indicating
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presence—and 0—indicating absence—was assigned. For example, if the organizational
biography of actor included a prior appointment to a national securities exchange,
employment with a banking institution, as well as a visiting professorship with a
university, a binary code of 1 was transcribed into the national regulatory agency,
banking industry, and academia columns. And a binary code of 0 was entered into the
remaining two columns—accounting industry and other.
Dataset4 also consists of the actor-level nodes (N = 407). Data collection for
dataset4 was completed during a comprehensive review of main and secondary sources.
In as much, these data were recorded as sources were systematically examined. This
systematic examination included the following source data: (a) bylaws; (b) incorporation
articles; (c) annual financial reports; (d) formal committee memberships; (e) ad hoc
committee memberships; (f) select meeting minutes; (g) select reports; (h) selected press
releases, communiqués or other administrative documents; and (i) non-administrative
documentation.
The completed dataset4 was an asymmetric matrix with the rows representing
individual actors and the columns representing the affiliation variables defined as the
organizations within the ISAB’s governance network. Furthermore, dataset4 was
theoretically defined as an affiliation network. A recordable event was defined as an
actor’s concurrent or previous board memberships, employment, committee
memberships, appointed positions, or otherwise documented official tie with any specific
organization within the governance network. A non-directional, binary value of 1—
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indicating presence—and 0—indicating absence—was assigned. To illustrate, a
recordable relational tie between actor (a1) and a specific organization within the
population (ith column) resulted in a coding of 1 in row a1, ith column. Multiple
relational ties of actor (a1) resulted in a coding of 1 in each respective organizational
column. For example, 3 organizational ties of a1 consisting of organizations 1, 2, and 3
resulted in coding of 1 in row a1, columns ith1…ith3.
Data Analysis
Several factors were considered prior to selecting the methods used to analyze
these network data. Of course, the selection of analytical techniques was dependent on
the purposeful intent of the researcher. Social network theory underscores numerous
levels of analysis by means of intricate mathematical notions. Moreover, these notions or
mathematical theories are designed to achieve extremely particularistic ends (Burt, 1976,
1972; Everett & Borgatti, 1999, 1998; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust,
1999). Consequently, the analytical technique must be considered respective of the
research objective.
Datasets1 and datasets4 were entered into Borgatti et al., (2002) social network
analysis software, Unicet and Cryam’s (2009) software, NetMiner. Much like traditional
statistical packages—correlations or regressions—these software packages are
programmed to perform the complex mathematical computations for innumerable types
of network analysis. This, of course, can be a double-edge sword. As mentioned above
network analysis is particularistic. In social network theory and methodology a wide
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range of diverse methods have been developed for a broad range of empirical objectives.
Thus, selecting the appropriate theoretical fit, network properties, set of nodes, types and
attributes of relational ties, level of analysis, excreta was critical to the validity of the
findings. On the other hand, if the aforementioned are carefully considered, the software
virtually eliminates errors in the complex mathematical operations required for social
network measurements. Additionally, internal validity was increased by the use of two
software packages to replicate the data analysis.
To achieve the objective presented in research question 1—presenting a holistic
graphic representation of the IASB’s governance network structure—graph theoretic
notion was employed. The data for dataset1 created a 1-mode network measuring the ties
between the organizational actors within the governance network. The relational ties of
authority coded in dataset1 were considered to be dichotomous, binary, and directional.
Or, the ties themselves were not necessarily related to other ties and they were either
present or not. Moreover, directional ties originate from one node to another node. At this
level of analysis, dataset1 was used to produce a directed graph or digraph (Hanneman &
Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
In general, graphic theory is concerned with producing graphic representations of
the structural ties linking social network data (Freeman, 2005). It is important to note that
social network principles were not used to determine the spatial arrangement of the graph
in this case. Or, the dataset was not tested for both cohesiveness and social role. Since
directional ties were used to measure the relational tie of authority the resulting graph
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produced a hierarchical view of the network focusing on the social role of each
organization within the network (Freeman, 2005). For the purposes here emphasis was
placed solely on social role in order to provide a more traditional graphic view of the
governance network instead of the overly complicated social and spatial view offered by
more complex graphic techniques (Freeman, 2005; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005)
Dataset2 corresponds to research question 2—what geographic locations are
represented in the IASB’s governance network. Dataset3 corresponds to research question
3—what professional perspectives are represented in the IASB’s governance network.
These datasets were analyzed as attribute data for the individual actors within the
network. Accordingly, analysis of such data does not require social network
methodology. Instead traditional mathematical methods were employed to meet these
research objectives. The inclusion of supplementary analysis of the network data was
intended to address the more descriptive aspects or actor-level properties within the
network structure. Therefore analyzing the characteristics of the network’s actors
provided an empirical method by which conceptual details were ascribed to the
governance network.
Dataset4 was tested for the extent in which actor-level nodes were structurally
embedded within the governance network. Structural embeddedness is defined by Jones
et al. (1997) as, “…a function of how many participants interact with one another, or how
likely future interactions are among participates, and how likely participants are to talk
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about these interactions” (p. 924). The question becomes; how is the above definition of
structural embeddedness derived from network analytics to achieve the objective herein?
Of course, as discussed above, the type of data or network is as important as the
property measured when selecting the appropriate methodological tools. The IASB’s
governance network is an affiliation network. Or, unlike traditional network data that
focus on the ties between actors, an affiliation network is concerned with the ties between
a set of actors and a set of events. Wasserman and Faust (1999) defined the properties of
affiliation networks as:
Affiliation networks are two-mode networks
Affiliation networks consist of subset of actors, rather than simply pairs of actors
Connections among members of one of the modes are based on linkages
established through the second mode
• Affiliation networks allow one to study the dual perspectives of the actors and the
events
(Wasserman & Faust, pp. 291-292, bullets original)
•
•
•

The IASB’s governance network is a 2-mode network. Recall that a 2-mode
network measures the relations or linkages between actors and events. Moreover, data
analysis for this network is intended to measure the actor’s affiliation variable—
comembership or structural embeddedness—to the organizations within the network.
This produces a subset of actors for each event which is consistent with the second
network mode (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Hanneman and Riddle (2005) deemed this
macro-level analysis. They wrote, “two-mode data offer some very interesting analytic
possibilities for gaining greater understanding of ‘macro-micro’” relations (Ch. 17,
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Introduction section). Specifically, the comembership overlap and co-organizational
overlap for dataset4 were measured.
The affiliation network was transformed into a 1-mode comembership network
and a 1-mode co-organizational overlap matrix. In the original 2-mode affiliation dataset
a tie between an actor and an organization resulted in a binary code of 1 in the actor row,
organizational column. Two actors were considered to be affiliated with the same
organization if both actors had a 1 in the same organizational column. The result was an
asymmetric 407 x 10, 2-mode network which was used to derive a 1-mode comembership
overlap matrix and the 1-mode co-organizational overlap matrix.
The comembership overlap matrix considers the number of organizational
comemberships shared by the individual actors. The number of times that 2 actors have a
1 in corresponding columns gives the number of events they have in common. These
comembership frequencies were transformed into an actor-by-actor matrix by recording
the number of organizations to which the actors jointly belong. Summing relations of the
actors to each organization resulted in a 407 x 407 symmetric sociomatrix with valued
relationships. The values assigned to each actor can range from 0 to 10. If an actor was
not affiliated with an organization a 0 was assigned. If an actor was affiliated with all
organizations, the maximum value of 10 was assigned (Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
The co-organizational overlap matrix considered the pairs of organizations shared
by 2 actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). The organization overlap matrix was created by
transposing the original 407 x 10 dataset into a 10 x 10 sociomatrix. Theoretically this
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matrix is defined as an event overlap matrix or in this case an organizational overlap
matrix. The transformation displayed the actor’s participation rates in an organization-byorganization matrix which recorded the number of actors that each pair of organizations
shares. Or, as the name implies it measured the degree of organizational overlap among
the actors. Like the comembership matrix above, the resulting co-organizational matrix
was a 1-mode, symmetric, valued sociomatrix (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). These results
are presented in chapter 4 and discussed in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Introduction
In this section the results from an empirical examination of the research questions
are presented. As stated in previous sections examining the structural properties of the
organizational as well as individual actors within the IASB’s governance network
provides an opportunity to contextually analyze the relational qualities of multiple
stakeholders while offering insights into the potential impacts of such arrangements
(Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). This empirical examination focused on four properties
of the IASB’s governance network; namely, which organizations constitute the IASB’s
governance network, what geographic locations are represented within the governance
network, what professional affiliations are present within the governance network, and to
what extent is the governance network structurally embedded.
The abovementioned properties correspond to the four research questions
proposed in chapter 1. The following results are organized by research question. First, the
research question is stated. A summary of the substantial findings follows each question.
Finally, an in depth discussion of these findings is advanced in chapter 5. A reference
guide to the acronyms used extensively in the following chapters is provided in Appendix
1.
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Results
Research Question 1: Which organizations constitute the IASB’s governance network
when defined in terms of social network theory and how are these organizations
hierarchically arranged?
Although additional graphic representations follow, the first portrayal of the IASB’s
network governance structure is a straightforward, holistic visualization. Figure 4 below
provides a nonscaled visualization of the organizational ties within the network coded for
authority. Each organizational node received a binary coding of 1 if a formal tie of
authority was present. To illustrate the BIS hosts the BCBS, IAIS, and FSF creating an
authoritative tie of both operational and financial viability as defined in previous sections.
If the BIS is represented by the b column/row; the BCBS by the e column/row; the IAIS
by the g column/row; and the FSF by the c column/row the resulting coding is notated as
(b,e), (b,g), and (b,c) = 1. The resulting image is a simple, directed digraph of the
hierarchical structure of dataset1.
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Note: Graph created with NetMiner cited as Cryam, 2009.

Figure 4: Nonscaled graph of IASB’s governance network illustrating directional ties of
authority between organizational nodes.
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A hierarchical organizational structure emerges based on the structural
mechanisms set forth in chapter 2. The Mentoring Group assumes the most striking
network position as an apparent intermediary authority over virtually every aspect—
general standards, auditing, and professional standards—of international accounting
regulation. This is not surprising given the Mentoring Group’s vague emergence in the
arena of global governance. Beyond ambiguous references by other organizations very
little is known and/or published about the Mentoring Group.
The more noteworthy position is that of the BIS, namely that the Mentoring
Group is comprised of 6 organizations, 3 of which are organizations hosted by the BIS. It
could be further argued that the IOSOC receives its organizational legitimacy, in large
part, from the BIS, IMF, and World Bank. Although this position is not reflected above
since only formalized ties of authority within the accounting regulation network were
included, international regulation of financial markets by global administrators is heavily
dependent on some form of national legitimacy (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b).
Research Question 2: What professional perspectives are represented by the
individual actors within the IASB’s governance network?
A total of 703 professional ties were found among the 407 actors in dataset2. As
illustrated in Table 3 below, the individual actors within the IASB’s governance network
have the largest number of professional ties to banking with 216 closely followed by 201
ties to national governmental regulators. The 155 professional ties to the public
accounting industry ranked a distant third. At face value; however, this outcome was not
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unanticipated given the organizational structure of the network. As noted above 4 of the
Mentoring Group’s 6 organizational members represent the banking industry.

Table 3
Professional Ties of the Individual Actors within the IASB’s Governance Network
National

Public

Regulator

Banking

Academia

Business

Accounting

Other

International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB)

48

68

18

29

60

13

Public Interest Oversight Board
(PIOB)

6

6

3

1

1

0

International Federation of
Accountants (IFAC)

19

14

14

17

92

3

Bank of International Settlements
(BIS)

66

77

9

1

0

4

World Bank

32

48

4

3

2

10

International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)

11

0

0

0

0

1

International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSOC)

19

3

0

1

0

0

Total

201

216

48

52

155

31

Percentage

29%

31%

7%

7%

22%

4%

Note. Among the 407 individual actors total number of ties = 703.
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The results from the subtotals of professional ties are more remarkable. When
partitioned by organization the individual actors within the IASB have more ties to
banking than public accounting with 68 and 60 respectively. Among the 36 members of
the 2 boards, namely the TAAG and IASB Foundation, with the authority to approve
IASB, SAC, and IFRIC board members 26 documented professional ties to banking were
found compared to 5 professional ties to public accounting. This is the intuitive reverse of
what one would expect from an accounting standard setting board.
Another substantial result is not with the sheer number of ties per se but with the
type of banking affiliations found in the primary and secondary source documentation.
Clearly a member of the BIS or World Bank is assumed to have a professional tie to
banking. However, the banking attribute was coded to include any reported tie to the
banking industry including central banks, public banks, private banks, investment banks,
and development banks. Within the banking industry a robust investment banking
subcategory emerged. Table 4 below provides a summary of the investment banking
subcategory. Of the 64 reported ties to investment banks 49 are for members of the IASB.
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Table 4
Professional Ties of Individual Actors to Investment Bank Subcategory
No. of
Organization
International
Accounting
Standards
Board (IASB)

Public
Interest
Oversight
Board (PIOB)

Role
TAAG
IASC Foundation
Standard's Board
SAC
IFRIC
Working Group

Actors
4
16
4
11
5
9
IASB Total

Oversight Board

World Bank
Bank of
International
Settlements
(BIS)

IFAC Board
Nominating
committee
IAESB Board

3

2
1
1
IFAC Total

7

2
World Bank Total

2

Executive Board

2
BIS Total

International
Organization
of Securities
Commissions
(IOSOC)

49

3

IESBA Board
Directors

Total

3
PIOB Total

International
Federation
of
Accountants
(IFAC)

Organization

Executive Committee

1

IOSOC Total
Investment Bank Subcategory Total

2

1
64
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Based on Brown’s (2004) study more professional ties to business were expected.
Business only comprised 7% of the professional ties. An actor was assumed to have a
professional tie to the business industry if the actor served in a high-level position for a
public company or if the actor had a tie to the board of a public company. Of the 59 ties
found to the business industry the majority were noted in the IASB. Twenty nine of the
59 ties were by IASB members. Moreover, 89% of the ties to business were found within
the two accounting standard setting bodies—the IASB and IFAC.
Business ties of the members within the accounting standard setters are justifiable
and consequently expected. International Financial Accounting Standards are primarily
intended to regulate the business community. Thus input by business experts, one of the
largest user groups, is essential to the standard setting process. According to these
findings it appears that professional representation from business is rather low when
compared to banking or national financial regulatory bodies.
The professional ties to academia and other professional groups were rather
disappointing with 7% and 4% respectively. Again the majority of these ties can be found
within the IASB and IFAC. Interestingly nearly half or 20 of the ties to academia were
instructors of economics and not accounting.
Research Question 3: What geographic locations are represented by the individual
actors within the IASB’s governance network?
Dataset3 consisted of the reported geographic location for 401 of the 407 actors.
Within the raw data set 6 of the 407 actors are reported as organizational observers or
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participants in general. These 6 actors were included for the other research question since
the organizational body represented was given. However, other specific information—
geographic location or biographies—about these observers was not provided. Given the
lack of geographic information these 6 actors were removed from this dataset. In sum, 56
geographic locations were reported in the total population.
This seemingly diverse geographic representation is not proportionate however.
As illustrated in Figure 5 below the United States and United Kingdom constitute a
combined 28% of the total geographic representation with 18% and 10% representation
respectively. Similarly the Western nations of the United States, United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Canada, and Italy comprise 51% of the overall representation. In fact,
only the 10 nations as depicted in Figure 5 below held more than 3% of the total. The
remaining 34% of other representation consists of 46 nations, 6 with 0.7% or 3 members,
8 with 0.5% or 2 members and 21 with 0.2% or 1 member.
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Figure 5: Percentages of geographic representation of individual actors for entire
network.
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In 2004 Brown found that only 3 of the 45 members of the SAC, none of the 13
members of the IFRIC, and 1 of the 14 members of the IASB hailed from developing
countries. Since Brown’s study; however, 8 of the 39 members of the SAC, 7 of the 21
members of the IFRIC, and 1 member of the 15 members of the IASB hail from
developing countries. Although the so-called Anglo-Saxon nations still retain over 50%
representation of the 3 aforementioned boards, the increase of members from developing
nations is marked.
Research Question 4: To what extent are the strategic members of the IASB’s
governance network structurally embedded as measured by relational ties such as codirectorship, employment or board memberships?
Dataset4 is a 2-mode, affiliation network. The first mode consists of the 407
individual actors and the second mode represents 10 of the 15 organizational entities.
Therefore the dataset forms an asymmetric 407 x 10 matrix recording the actor’s
affiliation with any of the 10 organizations. The organizational actors are the BIS, World
Bank, FSF, IAIS, IASB, PIOB, IOSOC, European Commission, BCBS, and the IFAC.
Since the IAASB, IESBA, IESB, and IPSASP are boards controlled and organized solely
by the IFAC the individual actors with an affiliation to these boards were coded to be
affiliated with the IFAC. Additionally, the board membership for the Monitoring Group
is not publically available. Therefore, the Monitoring Group could not be included as an
organizational category which is rather unfortunate given the Mentoring Group’s position
in the governance network.
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Affiliation networks can be represented in matrix form or as a bipartite graph.
Both representations are derived from the same data where the latter is in graphic form
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). The bipartite graph for Dataset4 is shown in Figure 6 below.
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Note: Created with NetMiner cited as Cryam, 2009.

Figure 6: Scaled bipartite graph of the affiliation matrix.
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Basic statistics to determine the distribution of ties in dataset4 were computed
using NetMiner software. The mean number of ties, standard deviation from the mean
number of ties, minimum number of ties, and maximum number of ties for the actors
within the dataset were computed. As shown in Table 5 below the minimum number of
actor ties or comembership links to an organizational node is 1. This finding is intuitive
as the actors were automatically linked with the organizational board on which they
served. The maximum links for a single actor was 4. Or, at least 1 actor has
comembership ties to 4 of the 10 organizations. The mean number of ties was computed
as the average number of ties for each of the 407 actors. The resulting mean of 1.464
indicates that the average ties among the 407 actors are to 1.464 organizations. Or, on
average each actor is tied to 1 to 2 organizations within the network.

Table 5
Distribution of Relational Ties for IASB Affiliation Network
MEASURES

VALUE

MEAN

1.464

STD.DEV.

0.707

MIN.

1

MAX.

4
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This mean is consistent with the actual pattern of ties noted in the 407 x 10
affiliation matrix. The total number of ties found was 596. Four actors had ties with 4
organizations, 33 actors had ties with 3 organizations, 105 actors had ties with 2
organizations, and 263 had ties with 1 organization. The actual distribution of ties also
seems to explain the relatively high standard deviation of 0.707.
The density of dataset4 was also examined. Density, as used here, is a measure of
organizational adjacency and is expressed as a value between 0 and 1 (Wasserman &
Faust, 1999). Two organizations are considered adjacent if they are linked by at least 1
common actor. For example, if none of the organizations are adjacent the value is 0, if
half of the nodes are adjacent the value is 0.5, and if all of the nodes are adjacent the
value is 1. The density for this network is 1. Thus, the network is considered a complete
graph or all organizational nodes share at least 1 actor in common (Wasserman & Faust,
1999).
To measure the comembership relationships of the actors, dataset4 was transposed
to derive a 1-mode, 407 x 407 comembership overlap matrix. Since this matrix is too
large to be reproduced in its entirety a partial representation for the first 10 actors in the
dataset is presented in Table 6 below. In general, matrices yields two sources of
information, namely the diagonal and the off-diagonal values. The diagonal values,
shaded in Table 6 below, give the total number of ties for the mode—organization or
actor—under study. Since this is an actor-by-actor matrix the diagonal values give the
total number of ties found for each actor. For example, the first diagonal entry for actor 1
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indicates that actor 1 is linked to 1 of the 10 organizations included in the analysis.
Accordingly actor 2—diagonial value in the row for actor 2, column actor 2—has a
relational tie to 2 organizations, actor 3 has ties to 4 organizations, and so forth. The
highest diagonal entries for the comembership matrix are 4. This confirms that the
maximum number of comembership for an actor is with 4 of the organizations.

Table 6
Partial Reproduction of IASB Comembership Overlap Matrix

Actor 1
Actor 2
Actor 3
Actor 4
Actor 5
Actor 6
Actor 7
Actor 8
Actor 9
Actor 10

Actor
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Actor
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Actor
3
1
1
4
2
1
1
2
2
2
1

Actor
4
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1

Actor
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Actor
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Actor
7
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1

Actor
8
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
3
1
1

Actor
9
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1

Actor
10
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2

Note. This matrix only reflects the first 10 actors within the database. The complete matrix is 407 x 407.
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The off-diagonal entries for the comembership overlap matrix, which is partial
reproduced in Table 6 above, measure the number of organizations to which a pair of
actors jointly belong (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). Accordingly, the off-diagonal values,
the unshaded values in Table 6 above, produce an actor-to-actor comparison of ties. For
example, the value of 1 in the column for actor 1 and row for actor 2 indicates that actors
1 and 2 are co-members of 1 organization. The value of 2 in the column for actor 3, row
for actor 4 indicates that actors 3 and 4 have identical comembership to 2 organizations.
In sum, every actor is compared with every other actor to produce the number of identical
comemberships.
The number of possible off-diagonal actor-to-actor connections in a 407 x 407
matrix is 165,242. This value is calculated by taking all possible combinations 165,649
(407 x 407) and removing the 407 diagonal entries. The off-diagonal entries range from 0
to 3. Whereas, 0 indicates that the 2 actors share no comemberships and 3 indicates that
they share 3 comemberships. A summary of the off-diagonal scores is presented in Table
7 below.
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Table 7
Off-diagonal Values for Comembership Overlap Matrix
No. of
comemberships for
pairs of actors
0
1
2
3
Total Possible
Occurrences

No. of entries in
matrix
114,948
46,976
3,216
102
165242

In an unconnected network scores of 0 and 1 are expected. Zeros are expected for
the actor-to-actor pairs across different organizations. Ones are expected for the actor-toactor pairs on the same organizational boards. For example, the 143 members selected
from the various IASB boards will exhibit a pair wise score of 1 since they are all
originally affiliated with the IASB. When compared with actors from other organizational
boards the value for IASB actors should equal 0 unless the actors are co-members of both
organizational boards.
As illustrated in Table 7 above the number of actors with identical
comemberships in 2 to 3 organizations within the IASB governance network is robust.
For example, 3,216 occurrences for the value of 2 were found. Moreover, 102 instances
of actors with 3 identical comemberships were found. According to the diagonal values
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the actual rates of comembership for the affiliation matrix were determined to be 4 actors
with ties to 4 organizations, 33 actors with ties to 3 organizations, 105 actors with ties to
2 organizations, and 263 actors with ties to 1 organization. This off-diagonal analysis
enhances the actual results by providing additional details about the rate of
comembership. For example, the diagonal results state only that 33 actors had ties to 3
organizations, not which organizations. When the diagonal and off-diagonal results are
combined they suggest that not only did multiple actors have multiple ties but multiple
actors had multiple pairs of identical ties. For example, 11 of the 33 actors not only had 3
comembership ties, but the 3 ties were to the same group of organizations.
To measure the number of organizations shared by each pair of actors dataset4
was transposed to derive a 1-mode, 407 x 407 co-organizational overlap matrix
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999). The co-organizational overlap matrix is presented in Table 8
below.
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Table 8
Values for IASB Co-organizational Overlap Matrix

BIS
WB
FSF
IAIS
IASB
PIOB
IOSCO
EU
BCBS
IFAC

BIS
84
7
31
1
7
1
0
24
27
2

WB
7
67
2
1
13
1
3
11
3
2

FSF
31
2
31
0
2
0
0
6
4
0

IAIS
1
1
0
15
1
1
1
0
0
1

IASB
7
13
2
1
150
3
11
18
3
19

PIOB
1
1
0
1
3
12
1
3
2
2

IOSCO
0
3
0
1
11
1
34
4
0
4

EU
24
11
6
0
18
3
4
57
6
10

BCBS
27
3
4
0
3
2
0
6
29
2

IFAC
2
2
0
1
19
2
4
10
2
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This matrix is calculated much like the comembership overlap matrix above.
Instead of focusing on pairs of actors, the focus is on pairs of organizations. Or, if 2
organizations have an actor in common in the original database both actors will have a
binary 1 in the organizational column. This matrix counts the number of actors with
recorded ties for each organization as well as the number of actors that had 2 or more
organizations in common.
The diagonal scores, the shaded values in Table 8, of the co-organizational
overlap matrix indicate the total number of actors who were affiliated with the
corresponding organization. At first glance it appears that the IASB has the most
members with 150, which is necessarily true. However, such an interpretation does not
consider that the number of actors representing each organization is not uniform. For
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example, 4 IASB boards were included with a total of 143 actors, whereas no European
Commission boards were included (see Table 1 on page 87). Instead, only the ties with
the European Commission by the actors of the other boards were considered.
Consequently, to interpret the diagonal values it is appropriate to normalize them by
considering the number of actors from each board included in the study. This
normalization is shown in Table 9 below.

Table 9
Comparison of Diagonal Values for the Co-organizational Overlap Matrix to Actor
Population

Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
World Bank (WB)
Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
International Assoc. of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS)
International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB)
Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB)
International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSOC)
EU Commission (EU)
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS)
International Federation of Accountants
(IFAC)
Total

Board
Members
28
48
27

CoOrganizational
Ties
Difference
84
56
67
19
31
4

12

15

3

143
10

150
12

7
2

19
0

34
57

15
57

22

29

7

98
407

117
596

19
189
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Table 9 accounts for the 407 automatic ties recorded for organizational boards to
which the 407 actors were affiliated. The organizational overlap matrix shows that the
407 actors had a total of 596 ties to the 10 organizations included in the study. As a result
the 407 actors were found to have 189 additional ties to organizations other than the
organizational board from which they were drawn.
The largest degree of organizational overlap was found with the European
Commission. This is not surprising considering that none of the board members from the
European Commission were included in the original dataset. Therefore, each tie is
automatically considered an organizational overlap tie. Nonetheless it is interesting to
note that 57 of the 407 actors had relational ties to the European Commission although
none of the original actors were drawn from these boards.
The BIS ranked a close second. The study included 17 members of the BIS Board
as well as 11 members of executive management for a total of 28 members. These 28
members produced 84 organizational ties with the other organizational boards for a total
increase of 56 co-organizational ties. Again, these results are not surprising considering
the BCBS, the IAIS, and the FAF are technically considered BIS hosted organizations.
However, these results do quantify the pervasiveness of BIS organizational overlap
within the seemingly unrelated accounting standard setting network.
The off-diagonal entries—unshaded values—found in Table 8 are also
noteworthy. The off-diagonal entries record the instances of actor overlap between the
organizations. The value of actor overlap for each organization ranges from 0, no pairs of
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actors share membership, to 31, meaning that 31 actors share membership in these
organizations. The FSF and BIS were found to have the greatest degree of actor overlap.
This is expected given that the FSF is a BIS hosted organization. In fact, by examining
the values found in the FSF row, it appears that the FSF has ties to the banking
organizations—BIS, World Bank, BCBS—, the European Commission, and the IASB.
Given the FSF’s mission to oversee stable financial markets it is questioned why the ties
outside of banking extend only to the accounting regulators and not the other financial
market regulators—the IAIS and the IOSOC.
From the off-diagonal entries for the IASB presented in Table 8 it is evident the
IASB board has co-organizational ties to every organization within the theoretical
governance network. The values in the IASB row indicate the IASB shares 7 coorganizational members with the BIS, 13 with the World Bank, 2 with the FSF, 1 with
the IAIS, 3 with the PIOB, 11 with the IOSOC, 18 with the European Commission, 3
with the BCBS, and 19 with the IFAC. In fact, the IASB is the only organization other
than the World Bank to have comembership ties to all the organizations within the
governance network. This may seem intuitive given that the focal node used to select the
IASB governance network was the IASB. However, the theoretical connection between
the IASB and the other organizations in the network is assumed to stop at the
organizational level or the organizations may be connected based on lines of authority,
but the individual members that constitute the organizational boards are assumed to be
autonomous members of a specific organization. Therefore, it is apparent that the
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members of the IASB board share considerable ties to every organization within the
governance network.
Summary of Findings
First, an organizational view of the IASB’s governance network was created.
From the nonscaled directed graph presented in Figure 4 it is evident that based on the
ties of authority the IASB’s governance network forms a hierarchical structure with the
Bank of International Settlements, World Bank, and Mentoring Group assuming
important positions.
Next, three attributes of the individual actors within the governance network were
measured—geographic representation, professional ties, and structural embeddedness.
Although over 50% of the actors represented Western nations the amount of geographic
diversity in the overall network was greater than expected. In fact, the geographic
diversity within the IASB since Brown’s (2004) study has increased considerably.
As illustrated in Table 3 the individual actors within the IASB’s governance
network have the largest number of professional ties to banking with 216 closely
followed by 201 ties to national governmental regulators. The 155 professional ties to the
public accounting industry ranked a distant third. This result mirrors the hierarchical
structure of the governance network with banking organizations assuming the most
prominent role. However, the relatively low number of ties to both the accounting and
business industries were both unexpected and striking.
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Network isomorphism was detected in the measures for structural embeddedness.
For example, dataset4 exhibited a perfect score for density. Or, every organization in the
governance network is connected by at least 1 actor. Furthermore, substantial results were
found on the measures of comembership overlap and co-organizational overlap.
Together the above results indicate that the IASB governance network is a
definable hierarchy that exhibits striking qualities of professionalization and structural
embeddedness. Rowley (1997) posited that, “as network density increases, the ability of a
focal organization’s [IASB] stakeholders to constrain the organization’s actions
increases” (p. 898). This indicates that in the face of divergent interests or continuous
accounting standards the IASB’s prominent stakeholders, found to be primarily banking
constituents, may have the ability to constrain the IASB’s action. These results are further
interpreted and discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
This researcher aimed to define the IASB’s governance network as well as to add
empirical details to this network. Based on social network theory the IASB’s governance
network was defined as an affiliation network whereas the connections among the actors
were based on their linkages to the organizations (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). To achieve
these goals two views of the IASB’s governance network were captured. The first view
was of the organizational actors and the second was of the individual actors holding
positions of influence within the organizations. As such this work presents a concurrent
analysis of the interplay between organizational actors and individual actors within the
governance network. This focus was intended to emphasize the duality between events,
organizations in this case, and actors common to the study of affiliation networks
(Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
The IASB governance network was defined using an ego-centric sampling
technique. This technique yielded 15 organizations to be included in the network based
on identifiable ties of authority. These organizations were briefly discussed and the
individual actors endowed with decision making authority within each organization were
identified. This effort contributes the first theoretical definition of the IASB’s governance
network in scholarly literature.
Beyond the formal organizational structure of the IASB’s governance network,
attributes of the individual actors holding elite positions were examined. The professional
affiliations, geographic representation, and structural embeddedness of these actors were
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analyzed. These variables are theorized to enhance the macroculture of the governance
network. Macroculture is defined by Jones et al. (1997) as, “…a system of widely shared
assumptions and values, comprising industry-specific, occupational, or professional
knowledge, that guide actions and create typical behavior patterns among independent
entities” (929). Specifically, the authors suggested that the more concentrated the
macroculture variable the more likely the network will assume certain, “values,
assumptions, and rule understandings” (p. 929).
Macroculture parallels DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) conceptualization of
professionalization as a process of normative isomorphism. Specifically, they asserted
that filtering was an important mechanism used to achieve professionalization. Filtering
is achieved by appointing individuals with similar credentials, experiences, connections,
and professional affiliations. Moreover, DiMaggio and Powell hypothesized that the
greater the dependence on an organization by another organization the more similar it
will become to that organization or the higher the level of isomorphism.
Conclusions
Prior to discussing these results it is important to emphasize that empirical
boundaries were not ascribed to these findings. Instead the purposes here are exploratory
and descriptive rather than statistical. In this manner the general focus when studying
affiliation networks is in interpretation rather than empirical predication (Wasserman &
Faust, 1999). Therefore, in this section the conclusions for each research question are
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provided. A detailed interpretative analysis of the data presented in chapter 4 is discussed
in the following section.
The intent of the first research question was to determine which organizations
constituted the IASB’s governance network and to examine how these organizations were
hierarchically arranged. The underlying theoretical considerations for this question were
to determine if a governance network existed in terms of social network theory and to
examine the governance network in terms of its organizational authority. First, it was
concluded that a discernible governance network does exist. Every organization within
the governance network is bound by formal and informal lines of authority (Jones et al.,
1997). Second, banking institutions—Bank of International Settlements and World
Bank—hold the most influential positions of authority within this governance network. In
terms of organizational authority (Jones et al., 1997), structural properties (Rowley,
1997), and operational viability (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b) these banking institutions can
exert substantial influence to ensure that their interests are secured in the arena of
international financial reporting standards.
The second research question was crafted to examine the professional
perspectives represented by the individual actors within the IASB’s governance network.
This concept of professionalization can have a profound impact on the nature and
direction of accounting regulation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Again, ties to the banking
industry were found. The individual actors exhibited more ties to the banking profession
than any other category. Professional ties to banking comprised 31% of the total ties
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found. In fact, the accounting industry ranked a distant third with 22% of the total ties.
The more concerning finding; however, was the type of banking ties noted. A robust
investment bank subcategory emerged with 64 reported professional ties, 49 of which
were professional ties of the IASB members directly. In fact, more ties were found to the
investment banking subcategory than to academia, business, and other groups which
included labor unions, environmental, social, and other interest groups not captured in
another category with 48 ties, 52 ties, and 31 ties respectively.
Although professional ties to national regulators—national regulatory interests—,
the accounting industry—subject matter expertise—, business industry—largest user
group applying the standards—, and even banking in general given the composition of
the governance network can be justified, the pervasiveness of investment banking ties is
highly suspect. This leads to two conclusions. First, when professionalization and
structural embeddedness are considered as criteria for safeguarding and coordinating
exchanges, the banking industry has the most dominate macroculture in this population
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jones et al., 1997). Second, representation by investment
banking interests, which are strictly profit motivated, is more embedded within the
governance network than any other academic, social, or environmental group. Such
representation is also considered a structural mechanism through which the banking
industry can influence the international accounting regulators.
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The geographic representation of the individual actors within the IASB’s
governance network was the focus of the third research question. The Western nations of
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States have majority
representation in the governance network. In fact, 51% of the representation is shared by
the these six Western nations whereas the remaining 49% is sparsely distributed among
56 nations. Accordingly, strong Western influence over the shaping of international
accounting regulations is certainly concluded. However, a considerable increase in
geographic representation was noted when the IASB’s governance network was
considered as a whole.
The final research question was intended to determine the extent to which the
individual actors of the IASB’s governance network were structurally embedded as
measured by relational ties such as co-directorship, employment, or board memberships.
Structural embeddedness is another mechanism used to safeguard exchanges and exercise
control within an inter-organizational network (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Granovetter,
1992; Jones et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997). The existence of structural embeddedness was
supported by the statistical properties of the affiliation matrix, as well as by the values
rendered in the comembership overlap matrix and co-organizational overlap matrix.
Accordingly, it is concluded that the IASB’s governance network is a considerably
structurally embedded network as the individual members have considerable
comembership ties to multiple organizations. Furthermore, the findings of the co-
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organizational overlap analysis exhibits similar patterns of control as representatives from
the Bank of International Settlements had the most co-organizational ties.

Interpretative Analysis of Data
In line with the conclusions above, a detailed analysis of the data is presented
below to further address the implications of each research question. Research questions 1
through 4 are presented in terms of organizational authority, professional affiliations,
geographic representation, and structural embeddedness respectively. It should also be
mentioned that too much embeddedness is not necessarily desirable. Overly embedded
networks are inherently problematic (Granovetter, 1973; Jones et al., 1997).
Consequently, an intermediate view is adopted where notable findings based on proven
interpretations are discussed.
Organizational Authority
The IASB governance network as defined herein is not an unconnected network.
The network exhibits perfect density which indicates that each organization is connected
to every other organization by virtue of authority. Going back to the concept of
operational viability it is assumed that the IASB will serve the interest of the entities
providing such viability at the expense of other stakeholders when such interests diverge.
It is evident based on ties of authority that the organizations theoretically defined as the
IASB’s governance network form somewhat of a hierarchical structure. While the
hierarchical view is probably more identifiable, the complex web of authoritative

130

agreements more closely resembles a form of network hierarchy and not a traditional
organizational hierarchy (Jones, et. al, 1997).
This graphic representation also renders the recent creation of the Mentoring
Group suspect from a network perspective. It appears that the Mentoring Group serves as
a specialize intermediary to represent the interest of higher-level organizations within the
network hierarchy, most notably the BIS. Clearly the financial as well as operational
viability of the Mentoring Group rests with the BIS, which also represents the highest
level of authority in the governance network. Granovetter (1992) noted this type of
coupling in the Chinese social structure where the product organizations are, “…highly
cohesive groups that are sharply delimited from one another; thus trust is available but
non-economic claims are illegitimate beyond these group boundaries” (p. 7). Or, the
formation of a legally separate entity creates the illusion of independence in appearance
but allows for the host organization to wield its influence.
However, great care must be employed in interpreting the impetus behind a new
organizational body (Hopwood, 1994). Although the rationale for the creation of the
Mentoring Group is not supported as an empirical fact in the present study, it can be
theorized as a structural mechanism created for the purpose of safeguarding exchanges
between the BIS and the IASB (Granovetter, 1992; Jones, et. al, 1997; Rowley, 1997).
This would be an interesting point for future research.
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Loft, Humphrey, and Turley (2006) drew on the embedded global influence of the
IFAC to conclude that the regulation of the accounting profession—via the IFAC—is
reconfiguring itself at the global level through a web of complex interorganizational
relationships. This interorganizational web forms what they deemed a “world financial
authority” (p. 444). This same web of organizational relationships was replicated herein
for both the IFAC as well as the IASB. Specifically, Loft et al. noted that the interests of
the global financial regulators, the IAIS, BIS, World Bank, and IOSOC to name a few, is
embedded into the regulatory process by virtue of the oversight provided by the
Mentoring Group. Figure 4 on page 101 illustrates that these same global institutions also
provide direct oversight to the IASB. Thus, it could be concluded that a discernible global
financial infrastructure exists.
Considering these results it is difficult to dismiss the notion of an intentional
arrangement that constitutes what could qualify as a global financial infrastructure.
Moreover, when considering significant global financial relationships this global
financial infrastructure should be detected if the scope is broad enough. For example, on
a global level the IOSOC regulates national securities exchanges, the IASI regulates
insurance transactions, the IFAC regulates the accounting profession, and the ISAB
regulates accounting standards. When these functions are overseen by the world’s
banking authorities, the BIS and World Bank, a global financial infrastructure is virtually
perfected.
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Influences over this global financial infrastructure do not seem haphazard.
Immediately two implications of such an arrangement bear mention. First, since this
infrastructure or network is dominated by stakeholders concerned almost exclusively with
financial market operation competing interests that are less operational and more social in
nature may be either intentionally or unintentionally dismissed. The second consideration
is whether other interest groups can gain reasonable access to this global financial
infrastructure.
Professional Affiliations
The findings for this variable seem to support a deductible macroculture and
underlying level of professionalization within the IASB’s governance network. The most
direct representation of professionalization can be found in the professional affiliations
for the individual actors as well as the relational ties among the actors. It does not seem to
be a consequence that organizations from the banking industry represent the highest level
of the hierarchy and that the most professional ties were found to the banking industry.
Since the actors within the banking industry were coded to have a professional tie to
banking this attribute was expected for these organizations. However, when partitioned
by organization the individual actors within the IASB were found to have more ties to
banking than to public accounting. Most notable were the ties detected in the boards with
the authority to appoint all other IASB members. Within these boards 26 documented
professional ties to banking were found compared to 5 professional ties to public
accounting.
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These results are further confounded when the banking category is delineated into
subcategories separating ties as belonging to central banks, public banks, private banks,
investment banks, and development banks. The number of ties within the IASB for
investment banks is only surpassed by the professional ties to the accounting industry.
Whereas professional ties to the accounting industry were expected, a notable number of
professional ties to investment banks were not. One reason that accounting regulation is
delegated to non-governmental organizations is to capitalize on private party accounting
expertise (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a). Deductively, a private body accounting regulator must
retain the expertise of experienced accountants. As Mattli and Buthe (2005a) noted an
accounting regulator needs, “…general accounting expertise, familiarity with existing
financial instruments, and knowledge of current practices in order to be able to write an
accounting standard that is feasible in implementation as well as effecting in achieving
the goals [of accounting]…” (p. 405). Based on these criteria alone the overwhelming
number of professional ties to investment banking is not intended to achieve the goals of
producing high quality accounting standards, which serve a broad range of interests.
Although the necessity for professional ties to accounting is not debated, the necessity for
professional ties to investments banks; however, is clearly questionable.
Furthermore, these findings support Perry and Nolke’s (2006) conclusion that
political influences on the IASB have morphed from those of business to those of
finance, as well as their previous findings in which Perry and Nolke (2005) used social
network analysis to examine the various committees of the IASB and the European
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Financial Reporting Advisory Group. In particular, they found that, “…financial sector
actors wield substantially more influence than other categories of business actors within
the governance of international accounting standard setting” (p. 1). Furthermore, they
noted a robust investment banking subcategory, which was reproduced here. Interestingly
they also found, “public actors have retreated and broad social constituencies are not
represented at all” (p. 17). This shift from the political influence of the business industry
to the financial industry does explain the results confirmed herein; especially the
unexpectedly low ties to the business industry, who had long been cited by accounting
scholars as controlling accounting regulation.
Consistent with the network analysis of Perry and Nolke (2005), not one
professional tie to unions or any other type of generalized labor interest were found
herein. In regard to labor only the interests of executive and elite workers were
represented within the network. In particular, ties categorized as other professions were
found to Financial Executives International, Michael C. Fina Co., and Mitchell Notley &
Associates. These groups specialize in executive compensation, recognition, and benefit
packages. Therefore it seems that although general labor is not represented executive
labor is. This is concerning since compensation related accounting regulation often
conveys vast society implications (James, 2008; Perry & Nolke, 2005, 2006).
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Geographic Diversity
From a geographic perspective the Western nations of the U.S., U.K., Germany,
France, Canada, and Italy comprise over 50% of the membership in the overall
governance network as well as the IASB boards directly. Although this cannot be
construed as Western control, it is an indication of Western influence of international
accounting standards. It has been claimed that the IASB is dominated by a narrow band
of Western, accounting experts (Brown, 2004). However, it should be noted that the
majority of accounting experts with free capital market expertise is concentrated within
the Anglo-Saxon countries (Mattli & Buthe, 2005b). Nonetheless, Brown (2004) noted,
“…a structure with a more egalitarian approach, a structure claiming to have legitimacy
based upon representativeness, would involve more representatives from the emerging
countries” (p. 387). As detailed in the previous section a marked increase in the
representatives from developing countries was noted within the IASB’s organizational
structure. This increase; however, cannot be ascribed to the overall network since a
benchmark for the network defined herein does not exist. For the IASB specifically such
a longitudinal increase in geographic representation from developing nations is consistent
with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory on institutional isomorphism that contends as
organizations emerge in a given field, “powerful forces emerge that lead them to become
more similar to one another” (p. 148). Or, the authoritative organizations for the IASB
are similarly geographically dispersed and thus the IASB’s governance network would
tend to follow this trend.
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As Schaub (2005) noted the jurisdictions directly applying the accounting
standards should be entitled to representation with the IASB network. This is not to say
that the idyllic mix of representation is necessarily proportionate. However, issues arise
when standards developed for mainly Anglo-Saxon financial markets are unilaterally
applied to all nations committed to international financial reporting standards. In some
instances—for example, the adoption of IAS 39 in the European Union—issues even
arise amongst the Anglo-Saxon countries (Schaub, 2005). For example, Caramanis
(2002) claimed that accounting convergence in Greece, consequently a free-market
capitalist European nation, marginalized Greek accounting professionals in what he
deemed to be, “…a complex system of superimposed, overlapping and often competing
national and international agencies of governance” (p. 379).
Although it is agreed that a truly global marketplace must be interpreted by a
codified set of consistently applied accounting standards, it is questioned whether the
economical and political interest of member nations should be assumed by standard
setting bodies on which member nations have little to no representation (Schaub, 2005).
For example, Geyer (1998) argued that the ability for nations to resist globalizing forces
with adverse social or cultural implications is partially a function of active national
lobbying against such forces. Herein; however, the case may not be as much for lobbying
against accounting convergence as it is for active involvement in the standard setting
process which undoubtedly affects national jurisdictions, each with a particular set of
needs and circumstances.
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Structural Embeddedness
Affiliation networks are commonly utilized to study interlocking directorates or
comemberships on organizational boards (Wasserman & Faust, 1999). This is one
theoretical definition of structural embeddedness (Granovetter, 1992). Dataset4 was
constructed as an affiliation network to study the interlocking directorates or
comembership ties among the individual actors within the IASB’s governance network.
Two characteristics of the comembership overlap and co-organizational overlap
results were striking. First, the results from both matrixes indicate that the individual
actors within this governance network are considerably structurally embedded. The actual
rates of comembership for the affiliation matrix revealed that 142 of the 407 actors had 2
or more comembership ties. This conclusion is supported in the co-organizational overlap
matrix which showed189 additional ties to organizations other than the organizational
boards from which the actors were drawn. In fact, the IASB board was shown to have coorganizational ties to every organization within the governance network. Theoretically
the governance network should be unconnected at the individual actor level even though
formal mechanisms of oversight and authority exist at the organizational level.
Second, the distribution of ties indicated a strong financial presence within the
network. The highest instances of co-organizational ties were found in the European
Commission with 57 ties. The BIS ranked a close second with 56. Again, these results are
not surprising considering the BCBS, the IAIS, and the FAF are technically considered
BIS hosted organizations. Moreover, other than the IASB the World Bank was the only
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organization with comembership ties to all the organizations within the governance
network.
Jones et al. (1997) theorized that effective network governance mechanisms must
strive to resolve problems of adapting, coordinating, and safeguarding exchanges (p.
917). By synthesizing social network theory and transaction cost economics theory they
posited that structural embeddedness is employed in network governance to enable social
mechanisms to resolve the aforementioned problems. Consequently, such mechanisms
likely enable the governance network to thrive even in rapidly changing markets.
Moreover, Jones et al. theorized that, “the interaction of these social mechanisms in
network governance may promote cooperative behavior while at the same time thwarting
problems characterized as social dilemmas” (p. 933-934).
These social network phenomena may, at least partially, explain the lack of
procedural transparency and inclusion (Hopwood, 1994; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b;
McCombie & Deo, 2005), multiple principal problem (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b),
narrow membership (Brown, 2004; Caramanis, 2002; Hopwood, 1994), national
legitimacy (Schmidt, 2002), regulatory fairness in the face of diverging interest (Chand &
White, 2007), and the influence of international organizations (Caramanis, 2002; Graham
& Neu, 2003; Lehman, 2005) previously noted with international accounting regulation.
In other words intentional structural embeddedness in network governance may manifest
as unbalanced, isolated cliques in which information is tightly controlled by seeming inmember factions (Jones et al., 1997; Granovetter, 1992). Faerman et al. (1999) concluded
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that this type of interorganizational cooperation was purposefully constructed in financial
regulation as an informal means of centralized control. Moreover, it appears that these in
member factions exercising this centralized control are heavily influenced by the
financial industry. This would imply various consequences for a broad base of
stakeholder groups.
Recommendations for Practice
Mattli and Buthe (2005b) concluded, “…lack of participation and accountability
may be caused not just by exclusion or non-transparent procedures, but also by
ignorance, information deficits, erroneous beliefs, or collective action dilemmas” (p.
226). It could be deduced that the latter conditions may foster, or possibly to a lesser
degree permit, the former conditions. Nevertheless, the focus of this work is to address
the lack of participation, accountability, and transparency in international accounting
regulatory processes, which may be due, in part, to ignorance, information deficits, or
collective action dilemmas.
Recognition of the structural processes underlying international accounting
regulation is the first step toward active involvement. As such, the present work creates
an empirical definition of the organizations which constitute the IASB’s governance
network and offers additional insights into the composition of this network’s
membership. Such information provides a valuable backdrop to assess both ongoing and
historical developments in accounting convergence. Beyond redressing the information
deficit, or possibly ignorance gap, several avenues for collective action for practical
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accountants, national governments, political advocates, or social groups can be drawn
from these conclusions although specific action is not endorsed per se.
The ability of stakeholder groups to uphold local values, cultures, or social
interests in the face of global pressure is, at least partly, a function of the group’s ability
to inform and mobilize collective action (Geyer, 1998). Although the structural forces of
the IASB’s governance network are clearly organized by powerful financial interest, the
overall legitimacy of the IASB is based on the premise that it exists as an independent
body to serve the greater public interest (IASB, 2008b). As demonstrated this global
financial infrastructure was intentionally and rationally created with theoretical
implications ranging from serving particular interests to safeguarding and coordinating
exchanges (Jones et al., 1997; Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b; Rowley, 1997).
Accordingly, underrepresented groups, whether they are geographic, professional, or
social, have a similar responsibility to inform and mobilize collective action on their own
behalf or potentially the behalf of others.
One possible avenue to inform and mobilize collective action is to keep abreast of
IASB activities. In this respect the IASB has recently amended its due process procedures
to increase transparency, accessibility, participation, and accountability. For example,
IASB agenda meetings as well as SAC and IFRIC meetings are open for public
observation as well as broadcasted and archived on the IASB’s website (IASCF, 2006).
Moreover, public comments are frequently solicited at various stages in the standard
setting process (IASCF, 2008d, 2006). In fact, a wealth of organizational information is
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freely available on the IASB’s website. The IFAC also publishes a vast amount of
information on its website and allows public participation in meetings. Consequently, the
IASB and IFAC can be classified as more transparent than the other financial
organizations in the IASB’s governance network (Loft et al., 2006).
However, strong limitations to IASB participation remain. For example, the IASB
has adopted a “comply or explain” (IASCF, 2006, p. 26) policy in which public meetings,
debates, and comments can be arbitrarily eliminated and replaced by an explanation of
deviation from due process. In fact, the IASB has revoked due process even in light of
highly conversational standards. For example, due process was revoked in the recent
passing of IAS 39 and IFRIC 9 guidance on embedded derivatives in the wake of the
financial crisis. This frustration is illustrated in a comment received by the FirstRand
Banking Group (2009), “while we appreciate that the IASB had to react to an unfolding
crisis we believe that lack of due process can and does impact on the credibility of the
standards” (p. 1). Furthermore, in cases where local interest conflict with the international
norms, collective action by these stakeholder groups is less likely to prevail (Caramanis,
2002; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Loft et al., 2006; Perry & Nolke,
2005, 2006).
Recommendations for Related Research
The potentialities for subsequent research based on these findings are rich. Most
directly it would be interesting to incorporate these results into a longitutidual
comparison with an empirical basis. As early as 1983 DiMaggio and Powell advanced
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several hypotheses to empirically predict organizational structure, process, and behavior
using longitutidual comparisons. These hypotheses are certainly adaptable to the data
utilized in the present study. Furthermore, Rowell (1997) and Jones et al. (1997) outlined
several propositions that could be approached with a longitutidual comparison building
on this work.
The rationale for a longitutidual comparison is twofold. First, as Geyer (1998)
demonstrated historically situated developments can provide a deeper understanding into
the present situation as well as its future prospects. Second, many social network theories,
such as Jones et al. (1997), posit conditions in which networks are likely to emerge and
thrive. As seen here, aspects of the IASB’s governance network have certainly morphed
in recent years. For example, since Brown’s (2004) study geographic representation has
increased and ties to the business industry have decreased. Moreover, several powerful
global organizations, for example, the Mentoring Group and Public Interest Oversight
Board, have secured dominate positions in international regulatory processes. If we
assume that the IASB’s governance network is adapting to safeguard and coordinate
exchanges (Jones et al.), to exert stakeholder influence and constrain organizational
behavior (Rowley, 1997), or to serve the interest of one stakeholder group at the expense
of other stakeholder groups (Mattli & Buthe, 2005a, 2005b), then the longitudinal
changes in this network can be used to draw particular conclusions.
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Concluding Statement
As previously mentioned accounting regulations impact the lives of everyone in
society. The regulations passed by the IASB are globally binding and inherently capable
of serving certain stakeholder interest at the expense of other stakeholder groups. Based
on these assumptions it appears that the structural forces of the IASB will lead it to serve
the interest of financial markets which are typically aligned with investment, profit, and
capital generation at the expense of labor and social relations (Brown, 2004). This
arrangement is likely to benefit investors and financial stakeholders over the interest of
workers and other social stakeholder groups (Langley, 2004; Perry & Nolke, 2006;
Waldenburger, 2002). As many rely on personal investment to fund retirement goals this,
in and of its self, may provide an overall benefit to society.
On this note it is worth mentioning the emerging status of the average investor.
As Perry and Nolke (2006) asserted, “…the ultimate owners of shares do not—for the
most part—actively participate in trading them and allocating their capital. Instead, that
task falls to investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies and the proprietary
trading desks of large international banks” (p. 566). Although these intermediaries
control and benefit from these funds, the investment risk is still assumed by the average
investor. In this respect it appears that banking controls a large portion of the flow of
capital as well as maintains a strong structurally embedded influence in the regulation of
the same capital. Moreover, given these and other issues the actual investor benefit as
well as the long-term feasibility of this type of retirement funding is questionable
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(Langley, 2004; Waldenburger, 2002). It would be interesting to study the checks and
balances of such a system.
The graphic representations as well as social network measures presented herein
raise substantial issues with the structural forces driving international accounting
regulation. Of course, it is nearly impossible to predict with certainty the level of
influence and/or regulatory actions of the IASB given that it operates in a complex,
highly political global space. Moreover, the efficacy of accounting convergence, in
general, is beyond the scope of this work. However, all stakeholder groups should be
concerned by the existence of structural mechanisms and should consider their impact on
international accounting standards. Although the IASB has a practical obligation to serve
the public interest: what is in the public’s interest and how can we be sure such interests
will be regarded (Baker, 2005)? Perhaps a better way to conceive these issues is that
powerful global financial organizations are employing structural mechanisms within the
IASB’s governance network which will likely ensure greater consideration in the
accounting standard setting process. Consequently, if these interests conflict with labor
groups, environmental organizations, humanitarian groups, or another such interested
stakeholders, will they be duly considered by the IASB? Many would say that given the
current structure and focus of the IASB, most likely not (Caramanis, 2002; Gallhofer &
Haslam, 2006; Graham & Neu, 2003; Loft et al., 2006; Perry & Nolke, 2005, 2006).
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The findings here suggest that the IASB’s governance network is embedded
within a much larger global financial infrastructure. Furthermore, powerful nongovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and Bank of International
Settlements are in a position to exert considerable influence over the accounting
regulators. Of equal concern is the sheer number of professional ties to investment banks,
which seem to be in a position not only to influence regulation but also to profit from the
same regulation at the expense of the average investor (Perry & Nolke, 2006). Therefore
the need for scholars, politicians, average investors, and interest groups to monitor the
development of international financial reporting standards seems to be of more urgent
concern than initially thought.
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IASC
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IOSOC
IBRD
ICSD
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NGO
OECD
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SAC
SEC
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SEC
TAAG
WTO

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Bank of International Settlements
Certified Public Accountant
Expert Advisory Panel
European Commission
European Economic and Social Committee
Financial Accounting Standards Board
Federal Reserve Board
Financial Stability Forum
Federal Trade Commission
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
International Auditing and Assurance Board
International Accounting Educational Standards Board
International Association of Insurance Supervisors
International Accounting Standards
International Accounting Standards Board
International Accounting Standards Committee
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation
International Education Standards Board
International Federation of Accountants
International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee
International Financial Reporting Standards
International Monetary Fund
International Public Sector Accounting Board
International Organization of Securities Commissions
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Center for Settlement and Agency Disputes
International Development Association
International Educational Standards
International Standards on Auditing
Nongovernmental Organization
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
Public Interest Oversight Board
Standards Advisory Committee
Securities and Exchange Commission
Public Interest Oversight Board
Securities Exchange Commission
Trustees Appointment Advisory Group
World Trade Organization
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